Middle East Observer
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Turkish Kurdistan

Turkish Kurdistan is the part of Kurdistan within Turkey and home to a substantial Kurdish population. Its modern history is shaped by the post-Ottoman settlement, Kurdish demands for cultural and political rights, conflict between the PKK and Turkey, and Turkish policy across the borders with Syria and Iraq.

সর্বশেষ সংশোধিত ১৫ নভেম্বর, ২০২৬পড়ার সময় 5 মিনিটতথ্যসূত্র · 16

এই প্রতিবেদনটি এখনও আপনার ভাষায় উপলব্ধ নয়। এটি ইংরেজিতে প্রদর্শিত হচ্ছে।

Overview

Turkish Kurdistan is the part of Kurdistan within Turkey. It is inhabited by Kurds, who constitute about 20 percent of Turkey’s population. Turkey contains the largest share of Kurdistan’s Muslim population. The region has no separate political status within the Turkish state. Its modern history includes Kurdish efforts to secure cultural expression and political representation, an armed conflict between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and periods of negotiation followed by renewed repression.

Turkish Kurdistan is also central to Turkey’s policy toward the neighboring parts of Kurdistan. Kurdish political and armed movements operate across borders, while Ankara has intervened militarily in Syrian Kurdistan and established a lasting military presence in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. Turkey maintains extensive trade with the Iraqi Kurdish authorities even as it opposes Kurdish independence there.

Geography

Turkish Kurdistan forms the portion of the wider Kurdistan region inside Turkey. The region’s position beside Syria, Iraq and Iran has made events across those borders consequential for its people and politics. The PKK’s presence in northern Iraq, the emergence of autonomous Kurdish territory in northern Syria, and Turkey’s control of border crossings have each connected developments in Turkish Kurdistan to those elsewhere in the Middle East.

The cross-border geography also shapes commerce and military policy. Turkey has developed a strategic commercial relationship with Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, with mutual trade averaging about $14 billion annually. At the same time, Turkish forces have repeatedly struck PKK bases inside that region. In northern Syria, Turkey closed its border to the autonomous Kurdish area and sought a buffer zone that would obstruct the connection of Kurdish-held territories along its southern frontier.

Jewish history

Jewish communities in Kurdistan lived across the region’s modern state boundaries. Before the great Kurdish Jewish exodus of 1950–51, Turkish Kurdistan had 11 Jewish communities, compared with 146 in Iraqi Kurdistan and 19 in Iranian Kurdistan. The small community in Turkish Kurdistan took part in that exodus. Its history forms part of both Kurdistan’s religious diversity and the wider Jewish exodus from the Muslim world.

Modern history

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War transformed the political setting of Kurdistan. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres envisaged autonomy for Kurdish-majority areas under a proposed postwar settlement, with a conditional route toward independence. That settlement was never implemented. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne recognized the borders of the new Turkish state without establishing a Kurdish state or a Kurdish autonomous region. The Kurdish-populated area within those borders became part of modern Turkey.

In the late 1970s, Abdullah Öcalan founded the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, an organization rooted in Turkish Kurdistan. The PKK launched an armed insurgency against the Turkish state in the 1980s. Its conflict with Turkey became a defining issue in the region and spread into neighboring Kurdish areas. Turkey has imprisoned Öcalan since 1999, but he remained a central figure in efforts to negotiate an end to the fighting.

During the first 13 years of his rule, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pursued a more conciliatory policy toward Turkey’s Kurds. His government allowed greater visibility for Kurdish culture and opened talks with Kurdish leaders and the PKK. A public peace process ran from 2009 to 2015. In March 2013, Öcalan called for a ceasefire and the withdrawal of PKK fighters from Turkey to Iraq. The pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, or HDP, gained national political strength during this period; its co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş took part in the political dialogue.

The peace process collapsed in 2015, and fighting resumed. Erdoğan replaced his conciliatory approach with a forceful crackdown on the HDP, its supporters and Kurdish activists. Turkish authorities suppressed Kurdish cultural activities and targeted Kurdish-language education. Demirtaş was arrested in November 2016 and imprisoned. About 12 HDP members were imprisoned from 2016 on charges involving terrorism and relations with the PKK. Kurdish political voices were increasingly excluded from national politics, leaving self-government in Turkish Kurdistan far from reach. Kurds in Turkey continued to seek restored political rights, democratic representation and peace between the PKK and the government.

Security

The PKK conflict has a regional dimension. Syria’s Democratic Union Party (PYD) is linked to the PKK, and the People’s Defense Units (YPG) are affiliated with it. During the Syrian civil war, the PYD sought to connect its territories around Kobani and Afrin with Sheikh Maqsoud, a Kurdish district of Aleppo. A contiguous autonomous area could also advance the PKK’s regional goals. The PKK’s prominent role in Syrian Kurdish territory contributed to Turkey’s decision to intervene there.

Turkey’s military involvement in Syrian Kurdistan began in 2016. Turkish forces attacked the Jarablus area to prevent the YPG from taking control of it and advancing west of Kobani. Ankara followed with major ground operations in 2018 and 2019. Its proposed buffer zone and border restrictions impeded efforts to link the Kurdish-held areas. Turkish military activity also brought ethnic demographic change to Kurdish areas. These interventions show how Turkey’s policy toward Turkish Kurdistan extends beyond domestic security into the territories of neighboring states.

In Iraq, Turkey has repeatedly struck PKK positions inside the Kurdistan Region. Successive Turkish campaigns beginning in 2018 left permanent bases and military posts. A map released by the Turkish presidency in 2020 marked 40 Turkish military bases inside the region. Turkish operations have continued alongside Ankara’s substantial commercial ties with the Kurdistan Regional Government. Turkey opposed the 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum, demonstrating the limits of that economic partnership.

Rivalries among Kurdish organizations further complicate cross-border relations. Longstanding tensions between the PKK and Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party disrupted trade between Syrian Kurds and the Kurdistan Regional Government. In late 2000 and early 2001, Iran resupplied the PKK during its fighting with Iraq’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. These episodes illustrate that Kurdish movements have pursued different alliances and interests despite their shared national identity.

Present day

Turkey’s May 2023 general election again made the Kurdish question a major issue for Erdoğan’s government. Kurdish demands for language rights, cultural activity and effective political representation remain distinct from the PKK’s armed actions. Measures directed at Kurdish education, civic activity and elected representatives have affected Kurdish public life beyond the armed conflict. Turkey’s approach continues to span Turkish Kurdistan, Syrian Kurdistan and Iraq’s Kurdistan Region through military operations, border policy and trade.

Israel has ties with Kurds, and Kurdish expressions of support for Israel have drawn attention from neighboring states. During Iraq’s 2017 Kurdistan Region independence referendum, some Kurds flew Israeli flags in Duhok and Erbil. The flags received hostile coverage in Turkish and Iranian media while both governments opposed the referendum. The episode showed how a vote in Iraqi Kurdistan reverberated across the wider region, including Turkey.

তথ্যসূত্র

  1. 1Kurdistanjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  2. 2Erdogan, the Kurds, and the Turkish Elections: What Next?inss.org.il
  3. 3Mapping Kurdish Optimism for a Biden Administration: Turkey and Iranwashingtoninstitute.org
  4. 4Syria's Kurds Are Contemplating an Aleppo Alliance with Assad and Russiawashingtoninstitute.org
  5. 5Rojava's Sustainability and the PKK's Regional Strategywashingtoninstitute.org
  6. 6Ascent of the PYD and the SDFwashingtoninstitute.org
  7. 7Iran's Dialogue of Deceitwashingtoninstitute.org
  8. 8Spotlight on Global Jihad (June 18-24, 2015)terrorism-info.org.il
  9. 9Why did Israel’s new foreign minister embrace the Kurdish people?fdd.org
  10. 10Turkey and Northern Iraq: Tightening Relations in a Volatile Environmentinss.org.il
  11. 11Nationalism and Turkish Foreign Policy Following the May 2023 Electionsinss.org.il
  12. 12The Erdoganian Amalgam: The Ottoman Past, the Ataturk Heritage, and the Arab Upheavalinss.org.il
  13. 13Back to Square One? The Collapse of the Peace Process with the Kurds in Turkeyinss.org.il
  14. 14How Erdogan Winswashingtoninstitute.org
  15. 15Turkey's Kurdish Pathwashingtoninstitute.org
  16. 16Merging Talks on Northeast Syria with a Whole-of-Country Approachwashingtoninstitute.org

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