Southern Transitional Council

Overview

The Southern Transitional Council (STC) is a political and military organization seeking independence for southern Yemen. Its program centers on restoring a southern state in territory that formed South Yemen before unification with northern Yemen in 1990. The council is led by President Aidarous al-Zubaidi and backed by the United Arab Emirates. It has governed parts of the south, including the port city of Aden, while fighting the Houthi terrorist organization during the Yemeni civil war. It has also participated in Yemen’s internationally recognized government, even as its forces have clashed with other forces aligned with that government.

The council’s position combines a claim to southern self-determination with a role in Yemen’s existing political institutions. That dual position has shaped successive negotiations over cabinet representation, military command and the country’s future structure. Saudi Arabia has sought to restore a unified Yemeni government, while the United Arab Emirates has supported southern independence aspirations associated with the council. Their different priorities became increasingly consequential as council-aligned forces expanded their territorial control. Southern opinion is itself diverse: other political groups rejected the council’s assertion of self-administration in Aden, and a separate movement in Hadramawt seeks autonomy for that governorate.

Founding and ideology

South Yemen ceased to exist as a separate state when it unified with northern Yemen in 1990. Resentment over the concentration of power in Sanaa helped produce Hirak, a southern separatist movement that emerged in 2007. Protests for southern independence drew Yemenis into the streets from 2013, before the Southern Transitional Council’s wartime rise. The 2014 National Dialogue Conference proposed a federal state as another response to the southern question. That proposal did not remove the independence movement’s demand for a restored southern state.

Founded in 2017, the council gave the independence cause a political leadership and an organized military constituency during Yemen’s civil war. Its stated program calls for a southern state with a democratic foundation. Council representatives have linked that goal to their account of decades of marginalization and to the costs borne by southerners during the war. They reject government by the Iran-aligned Axis of Resistance and the Houthis, as well as the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology as a basis for governing southern Yemen. Al Islah, the Brotherhood’s Yemeni affiliate, has been a particular rival within the coalition opposed to the Houthis.

The council seeks more than administrative control of Aden. In negotiations with Yemen’s government, it has sought substantial representation in a new cabinet or recognition of southern secession as a matter of self-determination. Amr al-Bidh, its foreign affairs representative, has proposed a transition followed by a referendum and rejected further attempts to recapture Sanaa militarily. These positions place the question of southern sovereignty alongside the immediate tasks of government, public services and security.

History

Southern separatist forces backed by the United Arab Emirates consolidated control of Aden in early August 2019 after clashes with forces of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi’s government. They seized the presidential palace and military facilities in the city, which served as Yemen’s temporary capital after the government lost Sanaa. The Hadi government lacked a strong military presence in Aden capable of competing with council forces, and its cabinet moved to Riyadh following the takeover. Control of the city gave the council leverage in negotiations over the composition of Yemen’s government and command of its armed forces.

Saudi Arabia mediated a ceasefire, military withdrawal and the Riyadh Agreement, signed by the council and Yemen’s government on November 5, 2019. The agreement sought to bring the two sides under one political and military command. It called for a government divided equally between northern and southern representatives and provided for council participation in consultations on a final political settlement. It did not settle which southern groups would receive the southern seats. Vague provisions and unresolved disputes over integrating opposing forces prevented full implementation. The council’s continued call for independence reflected both its original objective and the agreement’s failure to resolve the southern question.

On April 25, 2020, the council declared self-administration in Aden and rejected the Hadi government’s return from Riyadh. It tied the declaration to demands for payment of salaries and provision of public services. Other southern political groups rejected its unilateral claim to administer the south. The move dealt a serious blow to the Riyadh Agreement and showed that Saudi mediation had not reconciled forces opposed to the Houthis. A political formula for sharing cabinet posts could not, on its own, settle control of territory and armed units.

Military disputes also spread beyond Aden. After the council withdrew from the Riyadh Agreement’s military component, inconclusive fighting in Abyan Governorate preceded a renewed confrontation on Socotra. Council forces took the island, placing it outside Yemen’s government control. Saudi Arabia mediated a proposed reversal: council candidates would become Aden’s governor and security director, the council would withdraw from Aden, Saudi guarantees would support the agreement’s military provisions, and earlier conditions on Socotra would be restored. The proposed sequence exposed how decisions about appointments, troop withdrawals and control of the island had become linked.

In December 2025, council-aligned forces advanced across eastern Yemen. The council and its partners had already held southern coastal Hadramawt; on December 3, their forces captured Seiyun and key civilian and military sites in Hadramawt Valley after limited clashes. They displaced First Military Region troops aligned with Yemen’s recognized government and Al Islah from parts of the valley. In early December, council-aligned forces also seized Al Mahrah, extending their control across governorates of the former South Yemen. Their advance brought them into confrontation with Saudi-backed forces and with local interests that did not share the council’s state-building program. Some Hadramawt residents favored autonomy for their governorate rather than incorporation into a council-led southern state.

In late December 2025, UAE-backed southern forces rejected demands to leave recently seized eastern territory. Saudi Arabia struck Mukalla port overnight on December 29–30 amid the confrontation. On December 30, Presidential Leadership Council chairman Rashid al-Alimi ordered Emirati forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours and directed Saudi-backed Homeland Shield Forces to take camps in Hadramawt and Al Mahrah. Three southern members of the Presidential Leadership Council and STC-aligned Tariq Saleh rejected the decree, arguing that it lacked the collective approval required for council decisions. The dispute placed the council’s territorial gains, Saudi security concerns and the recognized government’s decision-making rules in direct conflict.

Structure and leadership

Aidarous al-Zubaidi is president of the Southern Transitional Council. The organization combines political representatives with affiliated armed and security forces operating in areas under its influence. Its foreign affairs representative, Amr al-Bidh, has advanced the council’s proposal for a transition and referendum on southern independence. The council’s participation in the internationally recognized government has given it a place inside national political institutions, while its armed formations have retained distinct interests and, at times, fought other government forces.

Affiliated authorities have also exercised powers over civic activity. In 2024, the council-affiliated National Southern Media Authority required hotels and event venues to obtain prior approval for media events. Security Belt Forces affiliated with the council arrested journalist Fahmy al-Alimi on July 18 after he criticized the organization. He spent five days in detention before agreeing to seek the authority’s approval for future media work. The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate recorded three violations involving the council that year. On Socotra, council-affiliated officials arrested French journalists Sylvain Mercadier and Quentin Mueller on May 28, confiscated their passports, laptops, cameras and books, and demanded the names of their sources and meeting places.

Funding and sponsors

The United Arab Emirates is the council’s principal external sponsor. Emirati support has helped develop the southern political and military force associated with the council, including backing for its leadership. Abu Dhabi’s interests in southern Yemen include security and influence along the coast and around major ports. Saudi Arabia, while also opposing the Houthis, has favored restoration of Yemen’s unified government. This divergence has repeatedly complicated efforts to keep the anti-Houthi coalition under a single command, particularly after the council’s seizures of Aden and eastern territory.

The council’s control of Aden has strategic weight beyond the contest over southern government. Aden lies near the Bab-el-Mandeb, the passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. Houthi attacks on shipping and the Iranian regime’s maritime influence affect commerce and Israel’s security. A capable UAE-backed southern authority controlling ports and coastline could constrain routes used to supply the Houthis. That is a potential counterweight, not an end to the Houthi threat: the organization retains its northern base, while fighting among its opponents weakens their common front. Al-Zubaidi has signaled openness to joining the Abraham Accords in the future; his statement did not establish a normalization agreement.

Attacks and operations

Council-aligned forces have fought the Houthis and rival forces within Yemen’s recognized government. Their most consequential operations against government-aligned units included the August 2019 seizure of Aden, the takeover of Socotra and the December 2025 advance into Hadramawt Valley and Al Mahrah. In 2023, the council announced the arrest of seven members of an Islamic State terrorist cell in Lahij Governorate, including a senior commander and foreign nationals, and reported finding weapons, ammunition and explosives. Al-Zubaidi has accused Al Islah of pulling its forces from areas into which the Houthis were advancing. Such disputes have persisted even while the council and Al Islah belonged to the broader camp resisting Houthi rule.

Abuses by forces associated with the council form part of its record of territorial control. In Aden in 2020, council-aligned forces unlawfully detained and tortured three youths from rival factions. The Yemeni human rights organization Mwatana documented eight abuse incidents involving UAE-backed forces associated with the council in 2023. Restrictions on journalists and media events in 2024 further showed the effect of council-affiliated security and administrative bodies on civil liberties. These actions are distinct from the council’s declared goal of building a democratic southern state and remain material to assessing how its authorities have governed.

Designations and international status

The Southern Transitional Council participates in Yemen’s internationally recognized government while advocating secession from it. The Riyadh Agreement treated the council as a negotiating party and envisaged its inclusion in government and consultations on a final settlement. Its political role has therefore coexisted with armed confrontations against other government-aligned forces. The disagreement is over Yemen’s future state structure, representation and command of security forces, as well as control of individual governorates.

The council is not the Houthi terrorist organization it fights. Its presence inside the recognized government also does not make it the sole representative of southern Yemen. Other southern groups opposed its 2020 self-administration declaration, while the movement for Hadramawt’s autonomy presents a different claim about local self-government. Both the 2014 federal proposal and the 2019 Riyadh Agreement offered alternatives to immediate secession; neither ended the council’s independence campaign.

Current status

By the end of December 2025, the council’s eastern advance had transformed its position from a force centered on Aden and southern coastal territory into one claiming control across the former South Yemen governorates. That expansion sharpened its confrontation with Saudi-backed forces and raised unresolved questions about Hadramawt, Al Mahrah, Socotra and the recognized government’s authority. Its leaders continued to pursue southern independence while occupying positions within Yemen’s political system.

The council’s future depended on whether its territorial gains could be reconciled with local southern demands, Saudi security priorities and the war against the Houthis. Control of Aden and nearby waterways gave its actions consequences for Red Sea shipping and Israel’s security, but Houthi power in the north remained intact. The council’s central political question was unchanged from the independence movement that preceded it: whether the former South Yemen would again become a separate state, and on what terms its varied communities would govern themselves.