Misrata

Overview

Misrata is Libya’s third-largest city and a major center of power in the country’s post-Gaddafi politics. Its prolonged resistance to forces loyal to Muammar Gaddafi during the 2011 Libyan civil war gave local armed groups military experience and lasting influence. The Halbous Brigade, Joint Operations Force and Nimr Brigade were among the groups rooted in that resistance. Misrata’s forces subsequently shaped struggles for control of Tripoli, fought the Islamic State at Sirte and took part in efforts to end Libya’s later civil war.

The city’s wartime prominence carries a difficult legacy. Militias from Misrata expelled the inhabitants of Tawargha after Gaddafi’s fall, and their return remained unresolved at the end of 2013. Misrata militiamen also played the leading role in the November 2013 Gharghur Massacre, when gunfire directed at a peaceful demonstration in Tripoli killed more than 40 people. These events placed Misrata’s armed groups at the center of debates over militia power, accountability and civilian protection. The city later became central to the defeat of the Islamic State’s territorial base in Sirte and to the defense of Tripoli against Khalifa Haftar in 2019.

Geography

Misrata lies on Libya’s Mediterranean coast between Tripoli and Sirte. Its position made it important both to campaigns moving west from Sirte and to movements of people and supplies between the capital and eastern Libya. Abu Qarin, south of Misrata, became a flashpoint as Islamic State forces pushed westward from their Sirte base. Sabha lies farther south along a route used by traffic departing Misrata; Islamic State operatives attacked three tanker trucks traveling from the city toward Sabha near Abu Qarin on October 8, 2015.

Misrata’s port and airport also gave the city importance beyond its immediate surroundings. In September 2018, rocket fire closed Tripoli’s only functioning airport and all flights were diverted to Misrata. The port remained relevant to international access and security: a vessel carrying explosive materials from Turkey toward Misrata was intercepted by the Greek coast guard. In 2022, an approved visit by the Christian-operated book ship MV Logos Hope was canceled after Misrata’s mayor asked port security to prevent it from docking. These episodes illustrate the city’s role as a transport hub and the extent to which local authorities and armed groups could affect access to it.

Modern history

Misrata endured some of the fiercest fighting of the 2011 revolution against Gaddafi. His forces besieged the city for months, using nearby Tawargha as a stronghold. Residents and local fighters maintained resistance through the prolonged assault. That experience became a source of political standing after the regime fell: the city could call upon armed organizations formed during the fighting, while its leaders and military councils held influence beyond municipal affairs. The Halbous Brigade, Joint Operations Force and Nimr Brigade exemplified the powerful groups that emerged from Misrata’s revolutionary resistance and remained available for later mobilization.

The aftermath of the siege brought collective punishment to Tawargha. After Gaddafi’s regime fell, Misrata militias attacked the town and compelled all its inhabitants to leave their homes. Tawargha had served as a stronghold for forces besieging Misrata, but that wartime role did not make its entire population responsible for the conduct of Gaddafi’s forces. By 2013, approximately 30,000 displaced Tawarghans accounted for more than half of Libya’s internally displaced people. Their local council postponed a proposed return, leaving the question unresolved at the end of that year. The displacement remained one of the clearest civilian consequences of Misrata’s rise as an armed power.

Militia authority also complicated the restoration of ordinary state institutions. In 2013, Misrata was one of three areas, alongside greater Tripoli and Benghazi, with the greatest concentration of detainees held by militias. The interim government urged armed groups to transfer detainees to authorized judicial authorities. Control of some detention facilities passed to the Judicial Police, although ministries sometimes shared control with the same militias that had operated them, or placed those groups formally under state authority without changing prison management. Libya’s Ministry of Justice renovated al-Jawwiyyah Prison in Misrata, transferred detainees there and publicly inaugurated the facility on August 13, 2013.

On November 15, 2013, militia members mostly from Misrata fired on a peaceful demonstration demanding an end to militia rule in Tripoli’s Gharghur neighborhood. More than 40 people were killed and hundreds were injured in the Gharghur Massacre. During the assault, militia fire killed one journalist, injured two others and seriously damaged the Tubactus television station. A Ministry of Justice investigation continued through the end of the year. Misrata militias withdrew from Tripoli after the massacre. Their departure reduced their immediate presence in the capital but did not end the influence of Misrata’s armed groups in national affairs.

During the 2014–2015 phase of the Libyan civil war, armed groups from Misrata supported Tripoli’s Dawn Coalition against Haftar’s Dignity Coalition. Haftar had consolidated forces in eastern Libya, drawing together former Gaddafi-era military personnel and tribal-affiliated groups. He then confronted the armed coalition around Tripoli and Misrata. Misrata’s participation gave the Dawn Coalition substantial forces with experience from the 2011 fighting. A brigade sent from Misrata to retake Sirte in March 2015 failed to reach the city, an early indication of the difficulty of dislodging the Islamic State from its growing base there.

Foreign support added another dimension to the struggle. Turkey and Qatar backed Misrata brigades allied with Fayez al-Sarraj, while the United Arab Emirates and Egypt backed Haftar’s forces. Misrata thus became a significant point of contact between Libya’s domestic armed competition and rival external powers. Its political importance was visible outside military affairs as well: during debate over elections and reconciliation in 2018, Italy counted political actors in Misrata among its traditional Libyan allies. The city’s influence rested on both its organized armed groups and its place in negotiations over Libya’s political future.

When Haftar attacked Tripoli in 2019, forces from Misrata again fought alongside those of the capital. The fighting renewed the role that Misrata’s armed groups had played in earlier coalitions opposed to Haftar. After the October 2020 ceasefire, Misrata was one of the western cities geographically represented among the generals serving on the UN-backed Joint Military Commission. That representation reflected the need to include commanders connected to the principal armed centers in negotiations over military arrangements. Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, a businessman from Misrata before becoming Libya’s prime minister, was another example of the city’s continuing place in national politics.

Security

The Islamic State’s seizure of Sirte made Misrata a likely target of its westward expansion. From its base in Sirte, the organization sought to advance toward Misrata and ultimately Tripoli. It held territory along Libya’s coastal road, disrupting the route between the capital and cities farther east. Islamic State forces took the Sirte power plant on June 9, 2015. By October, their operatives were active near Abu Qarin, where they attacked three tanker trucks traveling from Misrata toward Sabha. The attack showed that the threat extended beyond Sirte itself and affected traffic using routes south of Misrata.

In May 2016, Islamic State forces launched an offensive at Abu Qarin and nearby settlements, expanding their area of control west of Sirte toward Misrata. Their advance placed pressure on local militias and threatened the approaches to the city. Misrata’s Military Council and its subordinate units responded through the Bunyan al-Marsous operation against the Islamic State’s Sirte base. An operations room in Misrata managed the campaign. The operation brought the city’s armed organizations into a coordinated advance at a time when the Islamic State’s territorial expansion threatened Misrata and, farther west, Tripoli.

Forces advancing from Misrata retook Abu Qarin and continued toward Sirte. In late May and early June 2016, they captured a checkpoint west of Sirte and the Sirte power plant, which the Islamic State had held for nearly a year. Fighting continued for months as Misrata units pressed into the city. U.S. airstrikes and British Special Forces helped those units defeat the Islamic State forces in Sirte. Bunyan al-Marsous became one of Misrata’s most consequential military campaigns after 2011: it ended the organization’s territorial base in Sirte and reinforced the national importance of forces that had originated in the city’s revolutionary resistance.

The campaign also demonstrated the changing demands placed on Misrata’s armed groups. They had first formed to defend their own city during a siege, then entered struggles over Tripoli and Libya’s rival governments. At Sirte, they confronted an organization that sought to hold and expand territory across Libya. The presence of an operations room in Misrata, the advance through Abu Qarin and the prolonged battle for Sirte tied the city directly to the campaign’s planning and execution. The failed March 2015 attempt to reach Sirte preceded this larger operation and underscored how much force and coordination were required to retake the city.

Security concerns persisted after the Sirte campaign. Misrata remained connected to armed coalitions involved in the civil war, and its port was part of the wider contest over military supplies. From January 2020, major cargo ships carrying Turkish military equipment to forces of the Government of National Accord docked in Tripoli and Misrata. Turkish forces also operated land and naval facilities in Misrata. These developments strengthened the city’s strategic role during the fight against Haftar’s offensive, while linking its security to the continuing involvement of external powers in Libya.

Present day

Misrata’s postwar civic life includes a small Christian community. Its presence has coincided with restrictions affecting public expressions of Christianity. MV Logos Hope, a Christian-operated book ship, received permission in August 2022 to dock in Misrata, Benghazi and Tripoli. Religious authorities objected to the visit, and a government publications official asked the ship’s operators to remove 260 books from their exhibition list. The operators agreed to the request. In Misrata, the mayor asked port security to prevent the ship from docking, and its permission to visit the city was canceled.

Police also arrested foreign Christians and some Libyans during Christmas and New Year celebrations in Misrata in 2022. The arrests followed a warning that the celebrations did not represent the country’s religion or beliefs. A small Christian community continued to live in the city in 2023. Taken together, the blocked ship visit and the holiday arrests showed the limits on religious expression faced by Christians in Misrata, even as members of the community remained there.

In May 2023, a Misrata court sentenced 37 people convicted in connection with the Islamic State’s 2015 beheading of 21 foreign Coptic Christians in Sirte. The court imposed 23 death sentences and 14 prison terms. The case connected Misrata’s judicial institutions to one of the Islamic State’s most widely documented murders in Libya. It also marked a distinct part of the city’s record concerning religious freedom: while Christians in Misrata faced restrictions on worship and public celebration, a court in the city prosecuted those responsible for the mass killing of Coptic Christians.

Misrata remains a place where Libya’s major post-2011 questions meet. Its armed groups helped defend the city during revolution, wielded power in Tripoli, contributed to Tawargha’s unresolved displacement, fought the Islamic State and resisted Haftar’s assault on the capital. Its representatives took part in the military process following the 2020 ceasefire, while a Misrata businessman rose to the premiership. The city’s continuing importance therefore reaches beyond its size: decisions made by its political leaders, security forces and institutions have repeatedly affected the course of Libya’s conflict and its attempts to restore national governance.