Khalifa Haftar

Overview

Khalifa Haftar is the commander of the eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA) and a central figure in the Libyan civil war (2014–2020). His coalition held substantial territory in eastern Libya and parts of the south while competing with successive governments based in Tripoli. The elected House of Representatives in Tobruk backed his forces. The LNA nevertheless operated outside the authority of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), and Haftar refused to place the military under civilian control as required by the 2015 Libyan Political Agreement.

Haftar’s forces fought the Islamic State and other jihadist organizations in Benghazi and Derna. Their broader campaigns also killed and injured civilians. Estimates cited in a 2018 human rights report put deaths from LNA campaigns since 2014 in the hundreds and injuries in the thousands, including civilian casualties. Haftar’s April 2019 decision to attack Tripoli opened another major phase of the war. His forces besieged the capital, shelled residential areas and twice bombarded a hospital intended for patients with COVID-19.

Haftar drew military and political support from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Russia. Russian assistance developed from arms and experts into services purchased from the Wagner Group. Turkey backed Haftar’s opponents in Tripoli and intervened militarily, helping reverse his gains by June 2020. That reversal increased Ankara’s prospects for influence in Libya and its capacity to challenge Israeli interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Early life

Haftar spent approximately twenty years in northern Virginia and obtained United States citizenship during his long residence there. He returned to Libya in 2011 as the country’s political order unraveled. His years abroad and his return place his later command within a career that crossed Libya’s successive political upheavals. The civil war that followed brought him to prominence as the leader of an eastern coalition whose military reach exceeded the authority of any single national government.

Career

Haftar led one side of the 2014–2015 phase of Libya’s civil war. His Operation Dignity fought the Dawn Coalition, which included armed groups from Misrata and Tripoli, as well as Ansar al-Sharia and allied jihadist forces in Benghazi. The Dignity and Dawn coalitions formed around rival centers of military and political power. Turkey, Qatar and Sudan supported armed groups in western Libya, while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported Haftar’s eastern forces. Outside backing deepened the conflict and made a national settlement harder to implement.

The 2015 UN-brokered Libyan Political Agreement established the Government of National Accord under Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj but left Haftar’s place in the new order unresolved. The Tobruk-based House of Representatives supported the LNA and an eastern government aligned with it. The GNA governed from Tripoli and held internationally recognized authority, although its control was limited. Haftar’s refusal to put his forces under civilian command prevented the agreement from settling the question of national military authority. He also refused to meet UN envoy Martin Kobler during efforts to broaden support for the unity government.

Haftar used military advances to strengthen his position against the GNA. His forces seized a crucial eastern oil region while GNA-aligned forces fought the Islamic State near Sirte. Control of oil infrastructure gave his coalition influence beyond the territory it directly administered. By 2018, Haftar controlled territory in eastern Libya and parts of the south. The parallel eastern institutions and the Tripoli government remained in competition, while armed groups held power across areas where state authority was weak.

Negotiations did not resolve that division. International meetings in France in 2017 and 2018 and Italy in 2018 brought Haftar together with Sarraj, but produced no agreement to implement the political settlement or hold elections. France regarded Haftar as an important actor in the fight against jihadist groups and supported him during the conflict. His military command, the Tobruk parliament’s backing and his territorial control made him unavoidable in diplomatic talks, even as his rejection of civilian control obstructed the agreement those talks sought to implement.

Haftar also pursued outside military ties. In January 2017, he visited the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov off Libya’s coast and held a conference call with Russia’s defense minister about fighting jihadist groups. Russia initially supplied his forces with arms and experts. Haftar later purchased services from the Wagner Group, whose personnel strengthened the LNA during its attempt to take Tripoli. Egypt remained a major backer, and Haftar acknowledged close cooperation with it, particularly in intelligence sharing. The United Arab Emirates supported his forces and conducted airstrikes against their opponents.

His external relationships also generated diplomatic confrontations. Algeria barred him from entering in military uniform on December 18, 2016, because it did not recognize him as commander of Libya’s armed forces. In May 2017, Haftar criticized Algerian foreign minister Abdelkader Messahel for meeting Libyan political, military, civil and tribal figures. At a later meeting in Libya, Haftar accused Algeria’s army of crossing the border during the war and threatened to carry the conflict into Algeria within minutes. Libya’s Foreign Ministry disavowed his remarks and reaffirmed relations with Algeria.

Ideology and statements

Haftar presented his campaigns as a struggle against the Islamic State and other jihadist organizations. Operation Dignity fought Ansar al-Sharia and allied forces in Benghazi, and the LNA stated that its objective was to remove terrorist groups from Libya. This stated purpose accompanied a wider contest for territorial and political authority. Haftar’s opponents included forces aligned with the GNA, and his campaigns against them cannot be reduced to operations against jihadist groups.

His position on military authority became a defining issue in negotiations. The LNA had support from the elected Tobruk parliament, but Haftar refused the Libyan Political Agreement’s requirement that the military come under civilian control. His rejection left unresolved how an eastern commander and his forces would fit within a unified government. It also sustained the division between Libya’s rival institutions after the 2015 agreement.

Haftar’s statements on ceasefires changed with battlefield conditions. He left Russian-sponsored talks in Moscow without signing a ceasefire agreement despite Russian pressure. After Turkish-backed forces reversed the LNA’s gains in 2020, he proposed a ceasefire and renewed negotiations. The later proposal followed military losses; it did not erase his earlier refusal to sign in Moscow or his decision to launch the Tripoli offensive after mediation failed.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Fighting in Benghazi illustrated both the LNA’s confrontation with jihadist groups and the intensity of Haftar’s campaigns. In February 2016, his forces fought Islamic State operatives and the Shura Council of the Benghazi Revolutionaries. The Islamic State claimed that three bombs killed 22 of Haftar’s soldiers during that fighting. On June 22, 2016, Haftar’s forces launched another offensive against Islamic State and other jihadist positions in western Benghazi. Fighting against the Shura Council continued in western neighborhoods in January 2017.

The LNA also carried out ground and air attacks in Derna against opponents that included Islamic State members and affiliates. In 2018, it announced an operation to clear the city of extremist fighters. These battles formed a substantial part of Haftar’s military record, but the human cost extended across LNA campaigns. Media and nongovernmental estimates cited in the 2018 human rights report placed deaths since the campaigns began in 2014 in the hundreds and injuries in the thousands, including civilians. The report did not treat the LNA’s anti-jihadist operations as excluding civilian harm.

Haftar launched a surprise offensive in April 2019 to capture Tripoli and extend his control across Libya. The attack followed another failed attempt to mediate his dispute with the internationally recognized government there. LNA forces and their allies advanced against GNA-aligned groups, including forces from Misrata and Tripoli that fought together in defense of the capital. The offensive triggered a further round of civil war and developed into a months-long siege. Russia substantially backed Haftar’s attempt, and Wagner Group personnel supported the LNA on the ground.

Civilians suffered during the Tripoli campaign. Indiscriminate shelling of neighborhoods around the capital killed civilians and forced others from their homes or into dangerous conditions. Haftar’s forces twice bombarded a hospital intended to treat COVID-19 patients. Four days after a UN warning on April 20, further shelling by his forces killed three civilians. The attacks took place as the pandemic strained Libya’s damaged medical system. Civilian casualties and damage to care facilities were direct consequences of the offensive Haftar initiated.

Foreign intervention shaped the outcome. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates backed Haftar, while Turkey and Qatar supported forces in western Libya. Turkey and the GNA signed military cooperation and maritime agreements in November 2019. The Tobruk-based government linked to Haftar rejected the maritime agreement. Turkish drones and other military assistance helped GNA-aligned forces recapture towns and bases previously held by the LNA. Turkish intervention undermined Egypt’s backing of Haftar and changed the balance around Tripoli.

Calls for a ceasefire did not immediately end the campaign. Haftar refused Russian pressure to sign an agreement in Moscow and departed without signing. Wagner Group personnel withdrew from southern Tripoli after Turkish and Russian ceasefire calls in early 2020. As Turkish-backed forces advanced, the LNA and allied Russian mercenaries withdrew from the offensive against Tripoli in June 2020. Haftar then proposed a ceasefire and renewed negotiations. The failed assault left his eastern coalition intact but ended his immediate attempt to take the capital.

Haftar’s forces continued to report operations against the Islamic State after the Tripoli reversal. In September 2020, an LNA spokesman announced that an operation in Sabha had killed Abu Muadh al-Iraqi, described by the LNA as the Islamic State’s leader in North Africa, along with eight other commanders. The announcement showed that the LNA’s confrontation with Islamic State networks continued alongside its struggle for power against rival Libyan authorities.

Death or current status

Haftar retained control of eastern Libya after the October 2020 ceasefire and the later formation of the Government of National Unity. Control of Benghazi remained with his forces when an American drone was shot down over the city on August 22, 2022. The incident drew attention to the continuing Russian presence in Libya and to Haftar’s relationship with Moscow. His command survived the failure of the Tripoli offensive and the creation of a new national government.

Haftar continued to exert influence through territory and oil infrastructure. After he shut Libya’s crucial eastern oil region for weeks, Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh agreed to replace the head of the National Oil Corporation and increase regional salary payments. Haftar was also among the external actors supporting Hemedti during Sudan’s civil war. These roles reflected power exercised from eastern Libya beyond formal office in Tripoli.

Legacy

Haftar’s record combines military campaigns against the Islamic State and other jihadist groups with a prolonged challenge to Libya’s internationally recognized government. His forces fought in Benghazi and Derna and reported killing Islamic State commanders in Sabha. Their campaigns also caused civilian deaths and injuries. His decision to attack Tripoli in April 2019, the siege that followed and his refusal to sign the Moscow ceasefire are central to assessments of his role in prolonging Libya’s conflict.

His rise exposed a persistent problem in Libya’s political settlement: the elected Tobruk parliament backed the LNA, while the Tripoli government held international recognition and the 2015 agreement required civilian control of the military. Haftar rejected that requirement. Meetings abroad brought him into negotiations but did not produce elections or a unified chain of command. The October 2020 ceasefire ended the major Tripoli campaign without removing his control over eastern Libya.

Haftar’s alliances also made Libya a theater of wider regional competition. Egyptian and Emirati support helped sustain his forces; Russian arms, experts and Wagner Group services strengthened them further. Turkey’s intervention reversed his advance and expanded Ankara’s influence in Libya and across the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing its capacity to challenge Israeli interests there. The outcome demonstrated both the reach of Haftar’s foreign-backed coalition and the limits of its attempt to seize national power by force.