Organisation of Islamic Cooperation

Overview

The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) is an intergovernmental organization of 57 members. It is a diplomatic bloc, not a war, military operation or armed organization. Formerly called the Organization of the Islamic Conference, it provides a forum in which member governments coordinate positions on international affairs, religious sites, conflicts and the treatment of Muslim communities. Its membership includes states with sharply different interests, among them Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey. A common declaration therefore establishes a collective diplomatic position without necessarily producing a common military or economic policy.

The OIC’s founding concern was Jerusalem. It was established after the 1969 arson attack at Al-Aqsa Mosque on the Temple Mount, a site sacred to Jews and Muslims. Israel has remained central to the organization’s summits, statements and activity in international institutions. The OIC also addresses issues extending well beyond Israel, including terrorism, religious freedom and persecution. In 2014, for example, its secretary-general condemned the Islamic State’s forced displacement of Christians from Mosul.

Its scale gives the OIC a significant collective voice at the United Nations. Its members can advocate a position through speeches, proposed resolutions and voting blocs even when they differ over its practical consequences. In November 2016, Riyad al-Maliki counted OIC members among groups that had promised support for a proposed Security Council resolution against Israeli communities. Such coordination illustrates the organization’s diplomatic role; it does not make the OIC itself a party to a battlefield conflict.

Background

The attack on Al-Aqsa Mosque in August 1969 prompted governments to organize a collective response. The organization that followed was known for decades as the Organization of the Islamic Conference before adopting the name Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. The change in name did not alter its basic character as a forum of governments. Jerusalem remained a recurring focus, while meetings of foreign ministers and heads of government gave members a means to frame other international questions as shared concerns.

The OIC’s 1999 Convention on Combating International Terrorism shows a tension within its approach to political violence. The convention addresses terrorism while excepting peoples’ struggles, including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism and hegemony, when aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with international law. That distinction preserves a category of armed action outside the convention’s definition of terrorist crime. It does not, by itself, determine whether any particular attack is lawful. Attacks on civilians and hostage-taking remain distinct acts that require direct scrutiny rather than protection through a broad political label. The exception matters when governments and armed groups disagree over which violence should be condemned without qualification.

The OIC has also campaigned at the United Nations against what it calls defamation of religion. Pakistan has advanced proposals on its behalf, while Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the Iranian regime have played leading roles in the wider campaign. Proposed restrictions drew objections from advocates of freedom of expression and religion. UN Watch argued that human-rights protection belongs to people, while beliefs and political ideas must remain open to examination. In United Nations discussions, European representatives likewise distinguished protection from religious discrimination from legal protection for religions against criticism.

Anti-Muslim bigotry, threats, assault and vandalism concern treatment of people. Evidence-based criticism of Islamic doctrine or Political Islam concerns beliefs and political programs. The Center for the Study of Political Islam argues that the word “Islamophobia” has sometimes blurred that distinction, discouraging criticism of doctrine by treating it as hostility toward Muslims. The OIC’s defamation campaign made the distinction a practical question for international institutions: rules intended to protect people can also restrict speech if they protect ideas from challenge.

Course of the war

The OIC has not conducted a war. Its relevant course of action during the Gaza war has been diplomatic. Earlier episodes show how Jerusalem and Israel became subjects of collective OIC activity. In September 2015, the Iranian regime called for an emergency OIC meeting over developments on the Temple Mount. At the OIC summit in Istanbul in April 2016, Mahmoud Abbas urged delegates to seek an international defense umbrella. He accused Israel of rejecting peace and of using construction and excavations to alter Jerusalem’s Arab and Islamic character. He warned that conflict with Israel could become a religious conflict endangering world peace. These were claims made in a summit address, not findings established by the organization.

OIC members also acted together in United Nations diplomacy. In November 2016, al-Maliki described OIC countries as one of several blocs expected to support a proposed Security Council resolution concerning Israeli communities. The episode shows how the organization’s membership could be mobilized around a measure affecting Israel, even when individual states retained their own foreign policies. OIC positions were not confined to opposition to Israel: in 2016, the organization and the Arab League denounced Hezbollah, a terrorist organization, after the Gulf Cooperation Council blacklisted it.

After the October 7, 2023 attacks, the OIC became one forum for regional diplomacy concerning Israel and Gaza. Early in the war, the Iranian regime’s foreign minister attended an unscheduled OIC meeting on the conflict. Roughly a month after the fighting began, Saudi Arabia hosted a joint emergency summit of the OIC and Arab League in Riyadh. Iranian regime president Ebrahim Raisi attended, making the first visit by an Iranian president to Saudi Arabia in many years. Bashar al-Assad also attended. United Arab Emirates president Mohammed bin Zayed did not.

At the November 2023 Riyadh summit, participating governments called for an immediate end to Israel’s military operations and rejected Israel’s self-defense justification. The joint setting let the OIC and Arab League present those demands as a regional position rather than a series of separate national statements. It also brought governments with different relationships to Iran, Israel and one another into the same diplomatic forum. Their presence demonstrated the summit’s reach, while their differing interests limited what could be inferred about a lasting common strategy.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

Israel’s military operations in Gaza followed the October 7 attacks by Hamas, a terrorist organization. Protecting civilians and addressing the consequences of fighting were central stated concerns at the Riyadh summit. The participating governments nevertheless rejected Israel’s self-defense justification while demanding an immediate end to its operations. That position placed pressure on Israel’s conduct of the war. It did not resolve the separate questions of Hamas’s attacks on civilians, hostage-taking or conduct within civilian areas.

The OIC’s diplomatic framing affects how those questions enter international debate. A demand to protect civilians can address urgent harm, but an account centered on Israeli military action can leave the acts that began the war outside its principal demands. The distinction is consequential when resolutions and public campaigns seek action against one belligerent. Civilian protection applies to all parties; it requires examination of attacks on civilians and hostage-taking as well as military operations and their effects. A political category of legitimate armed struggle cannot substitute for that examination.

The organization’s position also developed through legal channels. In 2023, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) authorized the OIC to provide information in advisory proceedings concerning Israel. The OIC filed a written submission. The Court notified it of United Nations document dossiers received in June 2023 and, on 28 July, informed it that participants’ written statements could be downloaded from a dedicated portal. The Court later asked whether the OIC intended to take part in hearings opening in February 2024 and invited it to present an oral statement. Participation gave the organization a formal opportunity to put its position before judges. Authorization to participate did not itself amount to judicial acceptance of that position.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

Hamas’s attacks on civilians and hostage-taking are central to assessing the war and the diplomacy surrounding it. The OIC’s 1999 convention did not name Hamas’s 2023 conduct; its relevance lies in the wider distinction it drew between terrorism and some forms of armed struggle. When that distinction is invoked without clearly excluding attacks on civilians and hostage-taking, it can obscure the conduct under discussion. The acts themselves, their targets and their methods remain decisive. Calling a campaign resistance does not answer whether a particular attack targeted civilians.

OIC diplomacy can also shape the public account of battlefield events. By concentrating demands on Israel’s operations and their civilian consequences, a collective statement can increase pressure on Israel while giving less attention to Hamas’s choices. That is an assessment of the framing and its possible effect, not evidence that OIC governments directed Hamas’s military strategy. The distinction between a diplomatic position and operational control matters: the OIC can influence debate through statements, votes and legal submissions without commanding an armed group.

Media initiatives form another part of that environment. The Islamic Cooperation Youth Forum, an organization affiliated with the OIC, was named among key supporters of the Gaza Tribunal initiative. Affiliation and support for an initiative do not make the forum, the tribunal and the OIC the same institution. They do show how activity connected to the OIC extends beyond meetings of heads of government. Public campaigns, legal arguments and media presentations can all affect which events receive attention and how demands concerning Israel are expressed.

Outcome

The OIC’s 2023 summit produced a collective diplomatic position, not a settlement of the Gaza war. Its members called for an end to Israeli operations, while the organization continued to pursue international forums. The Riyadh meeting demonstrated that governments with divergent regional interests could assemble around a statement on Israel. Raisi’s attendance was especially notable after years without an Iranian presidential visit to Saudi Arabia; Mohammed bin Zayed’s absence showed that participation was not uniform. Neither fact establishes agreement among all members on broader regional policy.

The organization’s legal participation continued into 2025. On 2 January 2025, the OIC requested permission to provide information in another ICJ advisory proceeding concerning Israel’s obligations toward international organizations; the Court received the request on 28 January. It authorized the OIC to participate, and the OIC filed a written statement. The Court invited it to hearings scheduled to open on 28 April and set 17 March as the date for indicating whether it intended to attend. An oral statement was possible regardless of its written submission. On 25 March, the Court sent participants a list and detailed hearing schedule; on 4 April, it circulated a revised schedule.

These steps were procedural outcomes. They established the OIC’s place among organizations able to furnish information to the Court and enabled its arguments to be heard. They did not make the OIC a court, confer authority over Israel, or determine the merits of the legal questions. The proceedings nevertheless illustrate how a 57-member diplomatic bloc can carry positions formed in summits into formal international processes.

Aftermath and legacy

From its establishment after the 1969 arson attack through the 2025 ICJ proceedings, the OIC has linked concern for Jerusalem with wider diplomatic coordination. Its earlier name, Organization of the Islamic Conference, emphasized the meetings from which it developed; its current name reflects an enduring organization. Its members have used it to address Israel, religious expression, terrorism and the treatment of communities in conflict zones. The condemnation of the Islamic State’s displacement of Christians from Mosul and the denunciation of Hezbollah in 2016 are part of that record alongside its campaigns concerning Israel.

The 1999 terrorism convention remains significant because its exception for certain armed struggles requires careful application when violence is directed at civilians. The defamation-of-religion campaign raises a different enduring question: how governments can protect Muslims from bigotry while preserving freedom to criticize doctrine and political ideology. Both issues turn on precise distinctions. An armed cause does not excuse attacks on civilians, and protection of people does not require immunity for beliefs from evidence-based criticism.

The OIC’s record also reflects limits of collective diplomacy. A summit can state a position for participating governments; it cannot erase differences among them or establish disputed facts by declaration. During the Gaza war, its statements and participation in ICJ proceedings increased the reach of its position concerning Israel. The organization’s lasting significance lies in that capacity to coordinate governments, advance arguments and influence international debate while remaining an intergovernmental diplomatic bloc.