Israeli invasion of Syria (2024–present)

Overview

The Israeli invasion of Syria (2024–present) began during the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government in December 2024. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) entered the Area of Separation established by the 1974 Agreement on Disengagement between Israel and Syria and took the former Syrian summit outpost on Mount Hermon. At the same time, Israel launched Operation Bashan Arrow, an aerial and naval campaign against military assets abandoned by Assad’s forces across Syria. Israel sought to protect its border communities and prevent advanced weapons, including equipment associated with chemical-weapons facilities, from reaching hostile armed groups.

The operation followed the fall of the Assad regime in the early morning of December 8, 2024. Opposition forces had defeated it after an 11-day offensive. IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi had approved Operation Bashan Arrow on December 7, as the military prepared for the government’s collapse and the security crisis it could produce. Israeli forces reinforced defenses in the Golan Heights, part of the State of Israel and of historic Bashan, most of which lies in Syria and is today occupied by Syria.

The ground operation and strikes were distinct parts of the same response. Troops secured high ground and positions along Israel’s frontier; aircraft and naval forces attacked the former regime’s air defenses, missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, depots and weapons-production facilities. During the opening phase, the IDF estimated that it had destroyed 70–80 percent of Assad’s military assets. The entry into the Area of Separation violated the separation terms of the 1974 agreement, even as the collapse of Syrian border positions and an attack on a United Nations observer post formed the immediate security context for Israel’s decision.

Background

The 1974 disengagement agreement followed the Yom Kippur War. It placed Israeli and Syrian forces on opposite sides of an Area of Separation supervised by the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF). Its lines limited where each military could deploy. For decades, the arrangement separated the opposing forces along a frontier where the heights and nearby communities gave changes in military control immediate importance. Mount Hermon’s summit overlooks Israeli positions on the mountain and provides a view across parts of Syria and Lebanon.

Assad’s government had also made Syria a central route for the Iranian regime’s transfers of arms, supplies and funds to Hezbollah, a terrorist organization in Lebanon. The regime’s fall disrupted that route and threatened the Iranian regime’s foothold in Syria. It also left large quantities of Syrian military equipment without the command structure that had controlled them. Aircraft, air-defense systems, ballistic missiles and facilities used to develop or produce chemical weapons posed an immediate risk if acquired by terrorist organizations or other hostile forces. Israel’s pre-existing concern about weapons transfers to Hezbollah therefore converged with the danger posed by Assad’s abandoned arsenal.

The forces that overthrew Assad included Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly Al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise. Its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, emerged as a central figure in the transition. Assad’s defeat ended his rule, but it did not settle what form of government would replace it or how Syria’s armed factions would treat minorities and neighboring states. The opposition included jihadist and fundamentalist factions; Assad’s fall by itself did not establish a democratic order. Turkey gained a central role in Syria’s changed political landscape, while the Iranian regime faced the loss of its established position there.

The crisis reached the frontier before Damascus fell. Gunmen associated with Syrian armed factions attacked a UNDOF post near Hader in Quneitra Governorate shortly before Operation Bashan Arrow began. The IDF helped the post repel the attack. Armed factions had entered the buffer area as Syrian government forces withdrew, raising the prospect that hostile fighters could move into positions close to Israeli communities. Israel warned armed groups against crossing the Bravo Line, the eastern edge of the 1974 buffer zone. These events sharpened the importance of the Area of Separation as Assad’s forces abandoned their border posts.

Course of the war

On December 7, 2024, Halevi approved Operation Bashan Arrow. Assad’s regime collapsed in the early hours of December 8, and Syrian Arab Army units left positions near the border. Israeli armored units moved near Quneitra and entered the demilitarized Area of Separation. Israeli ground troops took control of the 235-square-kilometer zone and established positions chosen to strengthen Israel’s defenses. They also took the former Syrian summit outpost on Mount Hermon, the mountain’s highest position, which Syrian forces had previously held. Control of that outpost improved observation of approaches to Israel’s existing positions below it.

The ground advance reached abandoned Syrian Army strongholds as well as the summit. Paratroopers from the IDF’s 101st Battalion held Tel Kudna after Syrian forces left it. Israeli troops patrolled the buffer zone and nearby Syrian villages, met residents and collected weapons abandoned by Assad’s forces. After warning rebel forces away from the zone, the IDF arranged for nearby communities to disarm. The deployment placed Israeli troops among communities within and near an area that the 1974 agreement had reserved for separation under UN supervision.

By December 13, the IDF had deployed engineers, armor, paratroopers and the Egoz Unit along the Syrian border. Its troops occupied strategic positions within the Area of Separation while engineers reinforced defenses on Israel’s side of the frontier. Mount Hermon required separate preparations: its altitude and severe winter weather made a prolonged summit deployment difficult. Israeli forces nevertheless prepared to remain there while Israel assessed the security situation and sought a more durable arrangement.

Operation Bashan Arrow’s air campaign began as the ground deployment took shape. Israeli aircraft attacked air-defense systems first, reducing the threat to aircraft conducting further strikes. The campaign then reached military bases, ballistic-missile facilities, storage depots, aircraft and naval assets across Syria. Israeli strikes also targeted facilities used to develop or produce chemical weapons. The purpose was to destroy strategic capabilities that no longer had a reliable state custodian and could be taken by terrorist organizations or other forces hostile to Israel.

The opening attacks inflicted extensive losses on Assad’s former military. The IDF estimated that 70–80 percent of its military assets were destroyed. It reported destroying more than 90 percent of the Syrian surface-to-air missiles whose locations it had identified, including 80 percent of Syria’s SA-17 systems. The IDF also destroyed 40 percent of Syria’s fighter jets and its stock of loitering munitions during the operation’s opening days. Those figures describe Israeli assessments of the early campaign, rather than a final count of every Syrian weapon remaining after Assad’s fall.

Individual strikes show the campaign’s geographic reach and its focus on aircraft and missiles. Israel struck Al Dumayr Airbase northeast of Damascus, a facility used by Assad’s air force and the Iranian regime’s air force during the Syrian civil war. The strike destroyed three aircraft squadrons and a nearby missile and rocket storage site. At T-4 Airbase in Tiyas, Homs Province, Israeli strikes destroyed two Syrian Arab Air Force squadrons, including a squadron of ten SU-24 tactical bombers. Israel also attacked a central Scud missile production and storage facility in Homs. Naval strikes formed part of the wider effort to dismantle the former regime’s military capabilities.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz visited Mount Hermon’s summit on December 17. Netanyahu tied Israel’s stay there to finding an alternative arrangement that would safeguard Israeli national security. Katz emphasized the mountain’s value for detecting threats and the need to prepare troops for winter conditions. The visit underscored that the summit’s capture was more than a brief patrol: Israel intended to hold the position while the frontier remained unsettled.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

Israel’s stated security purpose was to keep hostile forces away from its communities and to prevent abandoned strategic weapons from reaching them. Its ground forces concentrated on the summit, the Area of Separation and nearby defensive positions, while strikes focused on former regime military assets. The attack on the UNDOF post near Hader showed that armed factions had already threatened an institution responsible for the border arrangement. Israeli assistance to the post and warnings issued at the Bravo Line were part of the immediate effort to prevent armed incursions across the separation area.

Within the zone, Israeli soldiers encountered Syrian residents as well as abandoned military equipment. Troops patrolled villages, met residents and gathered weapons left by Assad’s forces. The IDF arranged for nearby communities to disarm after warning rebel forces away from the buffer. Removing unsecured weapons reduced the chance that they would be used in local fighting or brought toward Israel’s frontier. The operation nevertheless placed foreign soldiers in populated Syrian areas, making residents’ security and freedom of movement continuing concerns.

The 1974 agreement’s separation terms did not permit the Israeli deployment inside the Area of Separation. Its breach is part of the operation’s legal and diplomatic context. Assad’s border forces had abandoned their positions, armed factions had moved into the area, and a UN observer post had been attacked. Israel treated those developments as an urgent threat to its own communities. The defensive rationale explains the decision to enter the zone; it does not erase the departure from the agreement’s prescribed separation of forces.

By January 2025, residents near Quneitra were demonstrating against the Israeli military presence and calling for UN intervention. Their protests showed that local opposition persisted even where Israeli forces had removed abandoned arms and met residents. The demands also made clear that the security interests of Israeli border communities and the wishes of Syrian residents were both consequential to any lasting arrangement. Netanyahu’s condition for leaving Mount Hermon concerned an alternative that would protect Israel, while Syrians sought a withdrawal from the summit and buffer zone.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

The initial attack on the UNDOF post near Hader was the clearest armed action by Syrian factions directly connected to the operation’s opening. Gunmen targeted personnel charged with observing the 1974 separation arrangement, and the IDF helped repel them. Israel’s subsequent warnings at the Bravo Line aimed to prevent armed groups from moving farther into the buffer area. The attack and the collapse of Syrian border units together increased the risk that fighters could reach strategically important ground overlooking Israel.

The danger from terrorist organizations extended beyond fighters near the frontier. Assad’s abandoned air defenses, missiles, aircraft and chemical-weapons facilities represented capabilities that hostile groups could potentially acquire during the transition. Hezbollah’s established supply route through Syria illustrated how Syrian territory had served an armed organization outside Syria. Assad’s fall severed a central route used by the Iranian regime to send Hezbollah arms, supplies and funds, but it did not remove the need to secure weapons already inside Syria or prevent new transfer routes from emerging.

HTS’s role in Assad’s overthrow also shaped Israel’s assessment. The organization had previously been Al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise, and al-Sharaa became a leading figure in the new order. His prominence did not determine the conduct of every Syrian faction or resident, but it mattered to the assessment of who might control abandoned weapons and positions near Israel. The uncertainty concerned the actions and governing program of particular armed groups, not Syrians as a whole.

Outcome

Operation Bashan Arrow rapidly changed the military balance along the frontier. Israeli troops held the former Syrian summit outpost on Mount Hermon and positions across the 1974 Area of Separation after Assad’s border forces withdrew. Israeli air and naval strikes destroyed much of the former regime’s strategic arsenal. The IDF’s early assessment put the destruction at 70–80 percent of Assad’s military assets, with particularly severe losses among known surface-to-air missiles. The campaign curtailed the immediate chance that intact Syrian aircraft, missiles and other weapons would pass to hostile forces during the collapse.

The operation also left an unresolved territorial and diplomatic question. Israel’s entry broke the separation terms set in 1974, and Syrian residents protested its continued presence. Netanyahu said Israel would remain on Mount Hermon until an alternative arrangement safeguarded its national security. That condition linked any withdrawal from the summit to future border security, while Israel’s forces prepared for a prolonged deployment through winter. The military results of the opening operation were therefore clearer than the duration and final terms of the ground presence.

Aftermath and legacy

In January 2025, al-Sharaa warned that Syria would apply pressure if Israel did not withdraw from Mount Hermon and the buffer zone. Residents in the Quneitra area demonstrated and called for UN intervention. These responses placed Israel’s defensive deployment within the wider contest over authority after Assad: Syria’s new leadership sought control over the border area, while Israel sought assurances that armed factions and strategic weapons would not threaten its communities. The future of the 1974 arrangement depended on security conditions that Assad’s collapse had abruptly changed.

Syria’s new border-security forces intercepted a truck carrying weapons intended for Hezbollah in Lebanon in January 2025. The seizure showed both the persistence of attempted weapons transfers and the disruption of the Iranian regime’s established route through Assad’s Syria. Turkey’s expanding role and the Iranian regime’s loss of its Syrian foothold further altered the regional setting in which Israel assessed its border. Syria’s reconstruction, the conduct of its new authorities and the treatment of its communities remained central to the prospects for a stable frontier.

The invasion’s lasting significance lies in the combination of a rapid ground advance into a long-standing UN-supervised separation area and a broad campaign to destroy the fallen regime’s weapons. Israel secured high ground and reduced a large arsenal during an acute security crisis. The same actions placed the future of the disengagement lines, the interests of Syrian residents and the conditions for an Israeli withdrawal at the center of relations between Israel and post-Assad Syria.