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Janjaweed

The Janjaweed were Sudanese government-backed Arab militias deployed against rebels and civilians in Darfur from 2003. Their campaign of murder, sexual violence and forced displacement formed part of the Darfur genocide; the Rapid Support Forces grew from the militias in 2013.

آخرین بازبینی ۲۴ آبان ۱۴۰۵4 دقیقه مطالعهمنابع · 15

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Overview

The Janjaweed were Arab militias armed and backed by the government of Sudan during the War in Darfur. Recruited largely from northern Baqqara Arab militiamen, they fought rebel movements and carried out systematic attacks on civilians across Darfur. Their horse-mounted operations led to a contemporary description of Janjaweed as “men on horseback.” The militia’s murder, rape, pillage and destruction of villages formed part of a genocidal campaign against the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit, three non-Arab communities. Sudanese forces joined the offensive, and the government in Khartoum bears direct responsibility for arming, deploying and sustaining the Janjaweed.

Founding and ideology

The Janjaweed emerged as a government-backed force after rebellion broke out in Darfur in February 2003. The Sudan Liberation Movement and its Sudan Liberation Army, joined by the Justice and Equality Movement, rose against Khartoum after years of neglect, discrimination and maladministration. Their attacks on government forces prompted Sudan’s rulers to arm and unleash northern Baqqara militiamen against the insurgency. Khartoum used attacks on communities identified with the rebels to destroy the largely non-Arab movements’ civilian support.

The campaign had an ethnic dimension, but Darfur’s communities did not form two uniform opposing camps. Some Darfurian Arabs fought alongside the rebels, while many opposed Janjaweed tactics; some non-Arabs supported Sudan’s government. The violence also arose from dictatorship, exclusion and Khartoum’s determination to retain power. Those divisions matter when describing the militia’s recruitment and targets without assigning its conduct to Darfur’s Arabs as a whole.

History

After the February 2003 uprising, the Janjaweed fought the Sudan Liberation Movement and Justice and Equality Movement while assaulting people identified as insurgent supporters. Sudanese government forces and the militias conducted a scorched-earth offensive that included killings, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual violence, village destruction and forced displacement. An early account estimated that Janjaweed attacks had left about one million civilians homeless. On June 24, 2004, U.S. Agency for International Development director Andrew Natsios estimated that Janjaweed forces had killed between 10,000 and 30,000 people. These were early assessments of an expanding war, not estimates for its full duration.

Later accounts recorded a much larger toll. An account published in 2006 estimated 200,000 deaths and more than two million people displaced after Darfur descended into violence. A separate estimate covering 2003 through 2008 put deaths during the offensive by Sudanese forces and government-backed Janjaweed at 400,000 and displacement at more than three million. Each figure reflects its own period and scope; none is a count of deaths caused solely by the Janjaweed.

Under a Darfur agreement announced in 2006, Sudan’s government promised to disarm the Janjaweed and punish ceasefire violators. It did not fulfill that commitment. When pressed on June 19 to disarm the militia, President Omar al-Bashir instead offered to send Sudan’s army to disarm all parties fighting in Darfur. In April 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush demanded that al-Bashir end government support for the Janjaweed. Repeated reporting at the UN Human Rights Council did not stop the killings, mass rape and ethnic cleansing.

Structure and leadership

The Janjaweed operated as militias recruited from northern Baqqara Arab fighters, rather than as a single conventional army unit. Their ties to the state were operational as well as political: Sudan armed them, government officials served as liaisons, and Sudanese forces participated in the wider campaign. A Janjaweed leader appeared alongside a Sudanese military commander and two other people in the annex to a 2006 U.S. sanctions order. The militia’s organizational lineage continued in the Rapid Support Forces, formed from Janjaweed militias in 2013 and led by Hemedti.

Funding and sponsors

Sudan’s government armed and funded the Janjaweed in response to the Darfur rebellion. Its backing enabled the militia to fight Khartoum’s opponents while attacking their perceived civilian supporters. U.S. sanctions later identified two senior Sudanese officials who acted as liaisons between the government and the Janjaweed. The U.S. Treasury also designated Azza Air Company for transporting weapons to the militia and Sudanese government forces in Darfur. These connections contradict any account of the Janjaweed as a force acting independently of Khartoum.

Attacks and operations

Janjaweed raids killed civilians, pillaged settlements, raped women and destroyed homes and property. The Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit were singled out in the genocidal campaign. Sudanese forces and government-backed militias also tortured civilians, subjected people to enforced disappearance, destroyed villages and drove residents from their homes. The attacks combined violence against individuals with the removal of entire communities from their land and sources of livelihood. Their purpose included breaking civilian support for the rebel forces.

The abuses continued despite diplomatic pressure and promises to halt them. At an annual meeting during the Darfur crisis, the Arab League expressed solidarity with Sudan without mentioning the humanitarian and human-rights abuses. Human-rights advocates criticized repeated UN reporting that failed to abate killings, mass rape and ethnic cleansing by Sudan’s army and its state-sponsored militias.

Designations and international status

President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13400 in April 2006, authorizing sanctions against people and entities involved in violence against Darfur’s civilians. Four people named in its annex included a Janjaweed leader and a Sudanese military commander. In 2007, the U.S. Treasury used the order to target two senior government liaisons to the Janjaweed, as well as Azza Air Company for weapons transport. International Criminal Court arrest warrants later sought al-Bashir over crimes connected to his support for the militias and the Darfur campaign.

Current status

The Rapid Support Forces carry forward the former Janjaweed militias’ organizational lineage. The force later helped remove al-Bashir, but that episode did not erase its origins in Darfur or its subsequent violence against Sudanese civilians. During the Sudanese civil war, Rapid Support Forces units have repeated raid tactics associated with the Janjaweed era. The militias’ history remains central to understanding both Sudan’s responsibility for the Darfur genocide and the conduct of their successor force.

منابع

  1. 1Genocide in Sudan?washingtoninstitute.org
  2. 2Mounting Humanitarian Catastrophe in Sudan: Implications for U.S. Policywashingtoninstitute.org
  3. 3Darfur and the Arab Leaguewashingtoninstitute.org
  4. 4AJC Calls for Inclusive Transition in Sudan, Accountability for Deposed President Omar al-Bashirajc.org
  5. 5George W. Bush Administration: Remarks at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museumjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  6. 637 NGOs Urge UN Secretary-General Ban to Intervene on Darfurunwatch.org
  7. 7Navigating the Sudan Sanctions Regimewashingtoninstitute.org
  8. 8The UN Arms Embargo on Sudan Is Broken. America Has a Plan to Fix Itfdd.org
  9. 9Islamic State calls for jihad in Sudanfdd.org
  10. 10Sudan on the Verge of Division? The Referendum, Oil, and Foreign Involvementinss.org.il
  11. 11Immigration to Israel: Sudanese Refugees in Israeljewishvirtuallibrary.org
  12. 12Sudan after the referendum: John Dau, Juan Branco, Bernard Schalscha address Geneva Summitunwatch.org
  13. 13African States Want to Condemn Israel While Ignoring Darfurunwatch.org
  14. 14issue 130: How to Fight Incitement to Genocideunwatch.org
  15. 15International prosecutor on Sudan says 2.5 million lives at stakeunwatch.org

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