Hadi al-Amiri

Overview

Hadi al-Amiri is a longtime commander and secretary-general of the Badr Organization, an Iraqi political and armed organization closely tied to the Iranian regime. Badr, previously known as the Badr Brigades, fought alongside Iran against Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of the 1980s. It developed enduring ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Under al-Amiri, Badr combined militia power with electoral influence and positions inside Iraqi institutions. He also held a deputy leadership role in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

Early life

Al-Amiri was born in 1956 in Khalis, in Iraq’s Diyala province. He left Iraq for Iran in the 1980s and joined the Badr Corps in 1988. Badr had been established by the IRGC as an armed force of the Iraqi opposition based in Iran. Al-Amiri took part in intelligence operations and rose through its command structure. As a young commander fighting on Iran’s side, he declared that Ruhollah Khomeini’s decisions on war and peace governed his own. His wartime service established the Iranian ties that remained central to Badr’s later role in Iraq.

Career

After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, Badr entered Iraqi politics while retaining armed networks. Al-Amiri served in parliament and led the organization as its secretary-general. Senior Badr commanders included Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani and Abu Muntadher al-Husseini. Its shura council included al-Amiri, Qasim al-Araji, al-Husseini, Mohammed al-Ghabban and Abu Ali al-Basri. Al-Amiri and al-Muhandis maintained close ties to the IRGC.

In 2012, al-Amiri led Badr’s break from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The split followed Ammar al-Hakim’s opposition to certain Iranian regime policies and his distancing from velayat-e faqih, the doctrine assigning supreme political authority to Iran’s leading jurist. The Badr Corps re-formed as the Badr Organization, a separate pro-Iranian political and armed organization. Its formal political role did not sever its Iranian ties.

Badr won 22 of Iraq’s 328 parliamentary seats in the 2014 election. It also expanded its influence within the Interior Ministry while Mohammed Ghabban, an al-Amiri assistant, ran the ministry. In Diyala, Badr assembled around 20,000 fighters and tightened its control over parts of the province that lay outside effective Iraqi state control. The organization sought a major share of seats in provincial elections planned for 2017, intending to turn local influence into more parliamentary and cabinet power.

Al-Amiri led the Conquest bloc, also called the Fatah Alliance, in Iraq’s 2018 parliamentary election. The pro-Iranian alliance won 47 seats and finished second behind the coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr. After the election, al-Sadr formed a political pact with al-Amiri. Al-Amiri and al-Sadr’s party later agreed to continue advancing legislation restricting the movement and activities of US forces in Iraq. Badr’s electoral gains gave al-Amiri a means to shape state policy alongside his command of an armed organization.

Ideology and statements

Al-Amiri’s allegiance to Iran’s leadership was visible from his wartime declaration about Khomeini. Badr remained fervently pro-Iranian after its 2012 separation from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Its links to the IRGC and its position inside Iraq’s security and political institutions made Iranian influence a central issue in public opposition to the group. During protests against the Iranian regime’s influence in Iraq, demonstrators burned images of al-Amiri alongside images of Ali Khamenei and Ruhollah Khomeini. Amid the protests, al-Amiri publicly apologized to Iraqis for political leaders’ failure to provide a decent life.

On October 10, 2023, al-Amiri praised the Hamas-led October 7 invasion of Israel. Hamas is a terrorist organization. Al-Amiri also warned that his forces would target US personnel if the United States intervened on Israel’s side. His remarks endorsed the invasion and carried a direct threat against Americans; they went beyond an expression of support for the Arabs of Gaza.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Al-Amiri was a senior PMF leader during the campaign against the Islamic State. Forces under PMF leaders including al-Amiri helped protect Samarra, Baghdad, Karbala and pilgrim routes; relieve the siege of Amerli; take Jurf al-Sakr; and clear the Islamic State from large parts of Diyala. These operations strengthened Badr’s military position and its claim to a lasting role in Iraq’s security system.

Al-Amiri and al-Muhandis used that position during negotiations over Iraq’s 2016 budget. They pressed Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to authorize a $2 billion PMF budget despite austerity cuts. Planned PMF salaries for 2016 rose to 120,000. The budget dispute showed the political weight carried by militia leaders whose forces had become central to the campaign against the Islamic State.

Al-Amiri also played a role in the dispute over Kirkuk following the 2017 Kurdistan independence referendum. After Kurdish forces withdrew from the city, a Kurdish parliamentarian published details of a reported nine-article agreement between Bafel Talabani and al-Amiri concerning Kirkuk and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan forces. Qasem Soleimani, then commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force, brokered the agreement, and al-Abadi supervised its conclusion. Within Iraq’s Turkmen militia network, former Badr figures gained powerful patrons during al-Muhandis’s era and moved beyond al-Amiri’s control.

Death or current status

Al-Amiri remained active in Iraqi politics in July 2025. During a visit to Baghdad, Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani met al-Amiri and other senior Iraqi political figures. The meeting illustrated continuing contact between al-Amiri and the Iranian regime’s military leadership decades after Badr’s founding.

Legacy

Al-Amiri’s career traces Badr’s development from an IRGC-backed force fighting in the Iran–Iraq War into an organization with fighters, parliamentary seats and influence inside the Interior Ministry. His leadership connected those sources of power: Badr’s operations against the Islamic State increased its standing, while its armed presence in Diyala and its role in national politics limited the Iraqi state’s independent control. The 2018 election and subsequent pact with al-Sadr showed the reach of al-Amiri’s political influence. His praise for the October 7 invasion and threat against US personnel showed that his alignment with Iran’s regional agenda continued alongside that formal role.