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Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh

Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh is a Libyan businessman who became prime minister of the Tripoli-based Government of National Unity in 2021. His extended tenure reflects Libya’s stalled elections, divided authority and struggle over oil revenue.

Son güncelleme: 15 Kasım 20264 dk okumaKaynakça · 15

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Overview

Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh is a Libyan politician and former businessman from Misrata. He heads the internationally recognized Government of National Unity, based in Tripoli. His appointment in 2021 followed years of fragmentation after the overthrow and death of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. Although the new government was intended to guide Libya toward elections, Dbeibeh remained in office after the vote was indefinitely postponed in 2022. His government’s rivalry with the eastern power structure led by Khalifa Haftar continues to limit its reach.

Early life

Before entering national office, Dbeibeh was a businessman from Misrata, a western Libyan city. His emergence as prime minister came through the United Nations-sponsored political process established after Libya’s civil war, rather than through a national election.

Career

In February 2021, the Libya Political Dialogue Forum selected Dbeibeh as prime minister and Mohamed al-Menfi as head of the Presidency Council. Their slate defeated one led by former interior minister Fathi Bashagha and House of Representatives chairman Aguila Saleh Issa. Dbeibeh received 39 votes in the 74-member forum. Accusations of vote-buying marred the selection, although the interim government also gained formal approval from the eastern-based House of Representatives. Dbeibeh’s mandate was meant to last no more than one year and to prepare the country for elections. Their indefinite postponement in 2022 left him governing well beyond that term. He refused to yield power to another interim administration proposed to oversee an election process.

Dbeibeh’s authority depended on institutions and armed groups in western Libya, while Haftar and his family retained military, political and economic power in the east. The division persisted despite the unity government’s international recognition. Dbeibeh distributed state funds and paid salaries through an arrangement with Libya’s Central Bank, which received oil revenue. After Haftar shut the crucial eastern oil region for weeks, Dbeibeh agreed to replace the head of the National Oil Corporation and increase regional salary payments. Control of oil production and public spending remained central to negotiations between the rival power structures.

Turkey backed Dbeibeh’s government. He assured Ankara that Libya would honor its maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey, signed by the previous Tripoli government. The agreement threatened plans for the EastMed gas pipeline involving Israel and its regional partners. Turkish military involvement in western Libya and support for the Tripoli authorities also formed part of the wider contest with Haftar’s eastern forces and their foreign backers.

Ideology and statements

Following a September 2021 parliamentary no-confidence vote, Dbeibeh aligned himself with the influential religious leader Sadiq al-Ghariani. He publicly called al-Ghariani his “sheikh and teacher.” Al-Ghariani, who headed the Dar al-Ifta, supported Dbeibeh’s continued premiership and sought special government funds to combat Christian converts. During their alignment, the Dar al-Ifta received monthly funding from the Central Bank through the Ministry of Finance. After al-Ghariani issued a fatwa against women traveling alone, Libya’s Internal Security Agency imposed travel restrictions requiring women to provide details of their journeys and reasons for traveling without a male chaperone. The restrictions drew criticism from Libyan advocates for women’s rights.

Role in attacks or conflicts

Dbeibeh took office after a ceasefire in the Libyan civil war, but conflict between western and eastern institutions continued. Following the September 2021 no-confidence vote, he led a march to storm the parliament in eastern Libya. In December 2022, armed groups loyal to him handed Lockerbie bombing suspect Abu Agila Masoud al-Marimi over for extradition to the United States. His government’s cooperation in the handover prompted a backlash in Libya. CIA Director William Burns met Dbeibeh in Tripoli during a January 12 visit that also included a meeting with Haftar in Benghazi.

In August 2023, Dbeibeh dismissed Foreign Minister Najla Mangoush after her meeting with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen became public. Mangoush fled Libya for Turkey. Senior Libyan officials maintained that Dbeibeh had approved the talks beforehand, while an Israeli official said the meeting had been coordinated at Tripoli’s highest levels. The competing accounts made the dismissal a further point of controversy around Dbeibeh’s leadership.

Death or current status

Dbeibeh remained prime minister during Libya’s 2026 unification efforts. He visited Turkey, Italy, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and met Emirati President Mohammed bin Zayed in Abu Dhabi after Saddam Haftar’s visit to Washington. These diplomatic contacts took place while national elections and a lasting settlement between Libya’s rival institutions remained unresolved.

Legacy

The September 2023 floods in Derna exposed the limits of Dbeibeh’s authority. He allocated 2 billion Libyan dinars in emergency funding, but could not visit the eastern disaster zone or direct the response there. Even the committee he designated to address the catastrophe was based in Tripoli. International recognition enabled his government to direct funds; it did not give it effective authority throughout Libya.

Dbeibeh’s influential nephew Ibrahim emerged as a possible western Libyan counterpart to Saddam Haftar in a proposed power-sharing arrangement. In western Libya, security, politics and economic activity revolved around Dbeibeh, his family and their loyalists, whose influence extended to major institutions including the Central Bank, National Oil Corporation and High National Elections Commission. Proposed unified-budget development projects were likewise tied to institutions associated with the Dbeibeh and Haftar families. These arrangements left the distribution of oil revenue, institutional accountability and the path to elections unresolved. Dbeibeh’s extended tenure illustrates the weakness of a transitional mandate sustained for years without a national vote.

Kaynakça

  1. 1Libya Floods: As Families Search for Loved Ones, Politicians Trade Blamewashingtoninstitute.org
  2. 2Russian Energy Cooperation with North African Countriesinss.org.il
  3. 3Libya Virtual Jewish History Tourjewishvirtuallibrary.org
  4. 4Libya Needs Elections, Not Another Leadership Selectionwashingtoninstitute.org
  5. 5Will Haftar’s Heir Be an Ally of the Russians or the Americans?washingtoninstitute.org
  6. 6Putin’s Position in MENA and the Turkish Electionswashingtoninstitute.org
  7. 7Takeaways from William Burns’ Surprise Visit to Libyawashingtoninstitute.org
  8. 8Could Libya Become Africa’s Afghanistan?washingtoninstitute.org
  9. 9Perpetual Deadlock Is Limiting Libya’s Potentialwashingtoninstitute.org
  10. 10Libya’s Prime Minister Fires Top Diplomat for Meeting With Israeli Counterpartfdd.org
  11. 11The Erosion of Public Trust in Libya's International Unification Effortswashingtoninstitute.org
  12. 12A Unified Government in Libya: Potential Regional Implicationsinss.org.il
  13. 13Between Maritime Law and Politics in the East Mediterraneanwashingtoninstitute.org
  14. 14Turkey Pivots to Tripoli: Implications for Libya’s Civil War and U.S. Policywashingtoninstitute.org
  15. 15Beyond the Ceasefire in Libyawashingtoninstitute.org

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