1978 South Lebanon conflict

Overview

The 1978 South Lebanon conflict was a military confrontation in Lebanon centered on Operation Litani, an offensive by Israel against the PLO’s armed infrastructure in the country’s south. Israeli infantry crossed the border on the night of March 14–15, three days after PLO attackers carried out the Coastal Road Massacre. Israel sought to push the PLO’s operational base beyond the Litani River and restore security to communities in northern Israel. Approximately 25,000 Israeli soldiers took part, with air and sea forces supporting the ground advance.

Within days, Israeli forces controlled much of southern Lebanon, though Tyre and its surroundings remained outside the area they reached. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions 425 and 426 on March 19, calling for Israeli withdrawal and establishing UNIFIL. Israel completed its 1978 withdrawal on June 13, handing many positions to its Lebanese allies. The operation preceded, but was separate from, the 1982 Lebanon War.

Background

After its expulsion from Jordan following Black September in 1970, the PLO established a quasi-state in southern Lebanon. It used that base for raids against civilians in northern Israel and to support attacks on Israelis abroad. Armed PLO activity along the border intensified while the Lebanese government struggled to exercise authority in the south. Major Saad Haddad’s Christian Army of South Lebanon, whose members also became PLO targets, developed an alliance with Israel.

The immediate trigger came on March 11, 1978. Eleven PLO attackers led by Dalal al-Mughrabi entered Israel from Lebanon by sea and seized an Israeli bus on the coastal road near Tel Aviv. The Coastal Road Massacre killed 35 Israeli civilians, including 13 children, and wounded 71 people. The PLO claimed responsibility. The attack was intended to disrupt Israel’s developing peace process with Egypt. Its combination of infiltration, hostage-taking and mass killing brought the threat from the PLO’s Lebanese base into sharp focus.

Israeli leaders decided to strike the infrastructure supporting such attacks and move the PLO’s operational reach away from the border. Chief of Staff Motta Gur and Northern Command chief Avigdor Ben Gal devised a plan that initially called for holding a strip extending about six miles into Lebanon. Israeli planners estimated that roughly 4,000 PLO attackers were based in the operational area. The intended advance therefore addressed both the March 11 massacre and the longer pattern of attacks launched from southern Lebanon.

Course of the war

Operation Litani opened on the night of March 14, when infantry brigades from the Israel Defense Forces’ 36th Division and its infantry and paratroopers command crossed into Lebanon. Armored formations and smaller operational units joined them after the initial crossing. Air and sea forces supported the northward ground advance. About 25,000 Israeli soldiers entered southern Lebanon over the course of the operation, making it a substantially larger effort than a border raid.

Israel coordinated its campaign with Haddad’s Army of South Lebanon. The allied Lebanese force shared Israel’s aim of removing the PLO from the area and provided a local partner as Israeli units advanced. On March 17, Israeli commanders decided to extend the operation toward the Litani River beyond the strip first contemplated. Israeli forces took towns and villages used as PLO headquarters and destroyed much of the group’s infrastructure in the operational area. Within days they controlled southern Lebanon apart from Tyre and its surrounding area.

Lebanon protested the operation to the Security Council on March 15 and denied involvement in the March 11 PLO raid. On March 19, the Council adopted Resolution 425, which called for Israeli forces to cease their military action and withdraw from Lebanese territory. Resolution 426 approved arrangements for a United Nations force with an initial six-month mandate. Defense Minister Ezer Weizman ordered the IDF to end Operation Litani on March 21. The first UNIFIL troops arrived in southern Lebanon on March 23.

Israel's conduct and the protection of civilians

Israel’s stated military objectives were to dismantle the PLO infrastructure used for attacks on civilians and to place the group’s operational base beyond the Litani River. The IDF used infantry, armor, air power and sea support to take control of the operational area. Israeli commanders left Tyre outside their advance; concern that urban fighting there would cause heavy casualties figured in that decision. The city and its surroundings consequently remained beyond the area Israeli forces reached.

The distinction between the PLO’s March 11 attack and Lebanon’s government was central to the diplomatic response. Lebanon denied any role in the raid even as it opposed the Israeli operation on its territory. Resolution 425 affirmed Lebanon’s territorial integrity and coupled its demand for Israeli withdrawal with a plan to restore security and Lebanese state authority. UNIFIL’s mandate reflected both concerns: it was to confirm Israeli withdrawal, help restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanon in reestablishing effective authority in the south.

Terrorist tactics and propaganda

The Coastal Road Massacre illustrated the PLO’s use of southern Lebanon as a launch point for attacks on Israeli civilians. Al-Mughrabi’s group crossed by sea, seized a civilian bus and killed passengers, including children. The PLO’s claim of responsibility tied the raid to the organization’s wider campaign. The intended disruption of Israel’s peace process with Egypt gave the attack a political purpose beyond its immediate victims. Its methods included infiltration and hostage-taking as well as indiscriminate violence against people traveling on the road.

The attack also acquired a later commemorative role in Fatah circles. Public tributes to al-Mughrabi presented a participant in the massacre as a model for others. That treatment formed part of the event’s legacy, distinct from the military outcome of Operation Litani. The massacre’s 35 civilian deaths and 71 wounded remain essential to understanding why Israel launched the operation three days later.

Outcome

Israeli forces killed approximately 300 PLO attackers during Operation Litani, while the IDF lost 18 soldiers. Much of the PLO’s infrastructure in the area was destroyed, but the organization’s threat was not eliminated. The establishment of UNIFIL created an international mechanism to oversee withdrawal and support the return of Lebanese authority. On April 21, the United Nations General Assembly appropriated $54 million for the force’s first six months, covering March 19 through September 18.

Israel completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon on June 13, 1978. As its troops departed, they handed many positions to Haddad’s Army of South Lebanon. This arrangement left the United Nations force and Lebanon’s government facing armed groups and contested control on the ground. By September, obstacles still prevented UNIFIL from deploying freely throughout its assigned area, and Lebanon had not restored full authority across its territory. The Security Council renewed UNIFIL’s mandate through January 19, 1979.

Aftermath and legacy

The withdrawal did not settle the security struggle in southern Lebanon. In January 1979, the Security Council criticized Israel’s lack of cooperation with UNIFIL and its assistance to irregular armed groups there. Continued difficulties in restoring Lebanese authority and securing UNIFIL’s freedom of movement kept Resolution 425 central to debate over the border. The PLO threat also persisted. Israel entered Lebanon again in June 1982, beginning a separate military campaign rather than a continuation of the March 1978 operation.

Resolution 425 retained significance long after Operation Litani ended. Israel withdrew its remaining forces from Lebanon in 2000. The Security Council endorsed the secretary-general’s finding that, as of June 16, 2000, Israel had withdrawn its forces in accordance with the resolution. That finding addressed the withdrawal requirement created during the 1978 conflict, while the history of UNIFIL and Lebanese state authority showed why the operation’s political consequences extended beyond Israel’s June 1978 departure.