Persecution of Baháʼís

Overview

The persecution of Baháʼís in Iran concerns a religious community whose faith arose in the country during the nineteenth century. Baháʼís have faced hostility at different points in Iranian history, but the 1979 Iranian Revolution marked a decisive change: clerics made persecution state policy. The Islamic Republic does not recognize the Baháʼí Faith as a religion. It has barred public ceremonies, dissolved community institutions, restricted education and employment, arrested believers, and seized their homes and other property. These measures affect Baháʼís in cities including Tehran, Isfahan and Mashhad, as well as smaller communities and villages. ^[3][4][6][8]

Iran’s constitution establishes Twelver Ja’afari Shia Islam as the state religion and recognizes Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians as religious minorities. It excludes Baháʼís. Constitutional nonrecognition shapes the community’s position across public life: authorities deny Baháʼís access to government and military posts, obstruct their education, and treat religious association as a security matter. The distinction is significant because Baháʼís accept the legitimacy of Islam, including Twelver Shia Islam, while maintaining the teachings and institutions of their own faith. Religious disagreement with Baháʼí beliefs became the basis for state restrictions on people who continued to practice them. ^[3][7][8][9]

The regime also portrays Baháʼís as agents of Israel because the Baháʼí world headquarters is located there. Iranian authorities restrict contact with coreligionists abroad and have used communication with the headquarters to support espionage accusations. A religious headquarters’ location establishes no wrongdoing by individual believers; the regime’s automatic treatment of Baháʼís as security threats targets them for their identity. Property cases show a related pattern. Courts have denied Baháʼí owners’ claims because of their beliefs, while security forces have seized deeds during raids. The resulting loss extends beyond places of worship to family homes, businesses, cemeteries and land. ^{[1][2][3][12]}

Origins

The Baháʼí Faith emerged in nineteenth-century Iran from the Bábí movement. The Báb’s teachings challenged established religious authority, and Baháʼuʼlláh subsequently became the central figure of the Baháʼí Faith. The community therefore has deep historical roots in Iran: its presence there did not begin with its later international institutions. Baháʼí belief developed in a society shaped by Shia Islam, and early disagreements over religious authority contributed to hostility toward its followers. Baháʼís regard the spread of their faith as a religious duty, while their teachings reject violent conflict. Their religious activity and communal organization became enduring points of friction with authorities that regarded the faith as a challenge. ^[3][4]

Hostility before the Islamic Republic did not take the same institutional form as persecution after 1979. The Pahlavi dynasty resisted clerical pressure to make persecution of Baháʼís official government policy. That resistance did not erase prejudice or attacks on the community, but it matters to the chronology: the revolution gave clerics control of the state and the means to turn religious opposition into constitutional exclusion, administrative bans, prosecutions and confiscations. Baháʼís remained an Iranian community throughout this change. Their long residence and ordinary ownership of land and homes did not protect them once state institutions began treating adherence to their faith as a reason to withhold rights. ^[3][4]

The subsequent conflict concerned more than whether authorities permitted a particular ceremony. Baháʼí communities depended on institutions to organize religious and communal life, on access to schools and work to support families, and on cemeteries to bury relatives in accordance with their rites. Each became subject to government intervention. The faith’s origins in Iran also make the regime’s recurring portrayal of Iranian Baháʼís as foreign agents especially consequential: the accusation recasts a community rooted in the country as an external security threat because its worldwide religious headquarters is in Israel. ^[2][3][12]

History

During the 1979 revolution, dozens of Baháʼís were lynched and many others were arrested. After the Islamic Republic was founded, clerics made persecution of the community a matter of state policy. The regime banned Baháʼí institutions in 1979 and confiscated their properties; in 1983 it formally dissolved the institutions. The loss deprived Baháʼís of recognized bodies through which to administer community affairs. Authorities also seized administrative centers, holy places, cemeteries and other holdings. Some seized properties were later destroyed. The measures joined constitutional exclusion to direct control over the community’s physical and institutional presence. ^[3][12][13]

Religious nonrecognition continued to affect worship and burial. The Islamic Republic forbids Baháʼís from publicly holding religious ceremonies and rituals. Authorities have prevented families from burying and honoring their dead according to Baháʼí tradition, while cemeteries have been damaged or made inaccessible. In May 2008, officials arrested two Baháʼí community officers and another Baháʼí in Isfahan over burials at a site the community had used for fifteen years. During the reporting period ending in 2010, cemeteries in Isfahan and several other cities were desecrated, defaced or blocked from community access. These acts interfered with both the care of existing graves and the burial of newly deceased relatives. ^[12][13]

The same restrictions appeared in Tabriz, where authorities routinely blocked burial of deceased Baháʼís at Vadi-i-Rahmat Cemetery. Remains were sent to Miandoab, preventing families from performing Baháʼí burial rites as they intended. Cemetery disputes show how exclusion reaches private grief and religious practice. They also demonstrate why confiscation of communal property cannot be measured only by land value: control of burial grounds determines whether families can maintain graves and conduct ceremonies across generations. Destruction and vandalism of Baháʼí cemeteries continued in 2022. ^[8][13]

Baháʼís sought relief through direct appeals to Iranian authorities. In November 2004, the community sent President Mohammad Khatami an open letter asking for an end to abuses of its human rights and religious freedom. Authorities prosecuted Mehran Kawsari in connection with distributing that letter, charging him with action against internal security. He was released from jail without bail on March 18, 2006. His case illustrates how a request to remedy discrimination could itself become the subject of a security proceeding. The government’s treatment of the letter also narrowed a peaceful means by which Baháʼís could seek protection from officials. ^[1]

Education became another persistent point of exclusion. Iranian authorities have denied Baháʼí students university admission or expelled them after learning their faith. In 2004, university entrance forms preprinted “Islam” as Baháʼí applicants’ religious affiliation, forcing a conflict between the application process and truthful identification. During one reporting period, more than 175 Baháʼí students enrolled in Iranian universities, but nearly half were expelled after officials discovered their religion. Such expulsions made admission no guarantee that a student could complete a degree. Reports also described pressure on younger pupils and restrictions on Baháʼís’ employment, compounding the effect of exclusion from higher education. ^[1][12][13]

Persecution and survival

Confiscation has long been a central instrument of persecution. Iranian authorities have disregarded Baháʼí property rights and seized private homes, businesses and religious materials. Homes used for Baháʼí youth classes were taken despite valid ownership documents. Other homes were transferred to an agency connected to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. These actions affected owners as individuals and weakened community life by removing spaces for study and gathering. When homes and businesses are confiscated, families lose both shelter and income; when religious materials are taken, ordinary practice becomes harder to sustain. ^[1][12]

The village of Ivel in Mazandaran Province became a prominent example of courts stripping Baháʼís of property rights. Two Iranian courts declared land ownership claims by 27 Baháʼís illegal, and in 2020 a court upheld confiscation of Baháʼí property there. The Ivel ruling tied denial of legitimate ownership to the owners’ beliefs, treating those beliefs as heretical and ritually unclean. The decision was therefore part of religious persecution, not merely an ordinary disagreement over title. It showed how judicial decisions could convert hostility toward a faith into loss of land held by members of that faith. ^[3]

Other cases followed the same pattern. In August 2021, judicial authorities notified six Baháʼí property owners in Semnan Province of imminent seizures. A Mazandaran court later ordered property belonging to Sheida Taeed transferred to the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order, a committee controlled by Khamenei. Authorities had arrested Taeed the previous September on undisclosed charges. The order reflected a regime position that Baháʼí property ownership lacked legitimacy because of the owners’ religion. Together, these cases show the role of courts alongside raids and administrative seizures: a deed could exist, yet officials could refuse to honor the owner’s rights. ^[3]

Security forces carried out coordinated raids on November 22, 2020, targeting Baháʼí homes in Tehran, Karaj, Isfahan, Mashhad and Kerman. Agents ransacked dozens of homes and confiscated computers, phones, photographs and religious books. Property ownership deeds were also seized. The raids reached Baháʼí-owned properties beyond the named cities, including properties in Semnan Province. Taking records and devices during simultaneous searches disrupted families and removed materials used in work, study and religious life. The seizure of ownership documents was especially consequential in a system that had already denied Baháʼís’ property claims. ^[6][9]

Criminal proceedings expanded alongside property seizures. At least 65 Baháʼís stood trial across Iran during a six-month period in 2019. Authorities arrested 64 Baháʼís between January and December 2021. Amendments to Iran’s penal code in 2021 increased Baháʼís’ exposure to prosecution for religious expression and teaching by criminalizing activities deemed contrary to Islamic law. In 2023, Iranian law allowed prison sentences of up to ten years for proselytizing religions other than Islam. Because Baháʼís regard sharing their faith as a religious duty, such provisions create a direct legal risk for religious activity. ^{[7][8][9][10]}

The crackdown intensified during Ebrahim Raisi’s presidency. In June 2022, a Revolutionary Court sentenced 26 Baháʼís from Shiraz in a mass trial. Prison terms ranged from two to five years; some defendants also received two years of internal exile and bans on foreign travel. The charges included causing “intellectual and ideological insecurity in Muslim society.” A Fars Province appeals court denied their appeals on August 30. Punishment thus extended beyond imprisonment to separation from home communities and limits on movement after release. The case showed how peaceful communal association could be recast as a threat to society. ^[8]

On July 19, 2022, security forces arrested five Baháʼís, searched their homes and sent them to the Shiraz Intelligence Detention Center. Across Iran in July and August, agents raided Baháʼí homes, confiscated property and arrested believers at home and work. In August, United Nations human-rights experts identified arbitrary arrests, occasional enforced disappearances, and destruction or confiscation of property as signs of systematic persecution. Their assessment addressed a pattern of actions rather than a single prosecution. It connected the raids, detentions and seizures to a broader state campaign against religious practice and identity. ^[8]

By October 2022, more than 1,000 Baháʼís were being held within Iran’s criminal justice system. That figure described people at different stages of proceedings, not solely prisoners serving sentences. At the end of 2023, more than 1,000 Baháʼís were imprisoned, in custody, under house arrest, or awaiting a hearing or court summons. The breadth of those categories matters: even outside prison, a person facing summons, house arrest or an unresolved case remains subject to state pressure. Reports for 2023 also recorded continuing raids, business closures, confiscations and criminal cases involving Baháʼís. ^[7][8]

Religion and culture

Baháʼí religious life in Iran has persisted despite the loss of formal institutions. Believers continue to identify with a faith founded in their country, to maintain family and community ties, and to seek ways to pass religious knowledge to younger generations. The government’s seizure of homes used for youth classes demonstrates how even privately owned places for instruction have come under pressure. Prohibitions on public ceremonies, restrictions on teaching, and the possibility of prosecution constrain activities that ordinarily sustain a religious community. Their combined effect is distinct from a ban on one organization: it reaches worship, education, social contact and the transmission of belief. ^[1][4][7][9]

Burial rites are another part of that continuity. Families’ efforts to maintain cemeteries and bury relatives according to their faith have repeatedly met official obstruction. Confiscation or destruction of a cemetery affects both current funerals and the community’s memory of earlier generations. The arrests over burials in Isfahan, restrictions in Tabriz, and damage to cemeteries in later years show that the issue has endured across decades and locations. They also show Baháʼís continuing to carry out religious obligations despite the risk of arrest or denial of access. ^[8][12][13]

The regime’s account of Baháʼí religious ties has made international contact especially sensitive. Authorities restrict communication with coreligionists abroad and invoke contact with the Baháʼí headquarters in Israel in espionage accusations. Such accusations treat normal links within a worldwide faith as evidence of disloyalty. The community’s teachings reject violent conflict, and the location of its headquarters does not make Iranian Baháʼís agents of Israel. State portrayal of an entire community as a security threat has nevertheless helped justify surveillance, arrests and pressure on its institutions. ^[2][3][12]

Present day

The pattern documented through 2023 combines constitutional exclusion with direct action by courts, security forces and other state bodies. Baháʼís face barriers to university study, government employment and public religious practice. Raids can remove family possessions and deeds; court orders can transfer homes and land; prosecutions can lead to imprisonment, internal exile or prolonged uncertainty. Religious identity links these otherwise varied measures. The Ivel ruling made that connection explicit by denying ownership because the owners were Baháʼís. Cases elsewhere show how property seizures and security accusations reinforce one another. ^[3][7][8][9]

International responses have focused on the community’s rights. In March 2020, the Anti-Defamation League endorsed a bipartisan United States congressional resolution condemning the Iranian regime’s persecution of Baháʼís and calling for sanctions against officials responsible for serious abuses. United Nations experts raised the alarm again during the 2022 crackdown. These interventions addressed continuing restrictions on freedom of religion, property, education and personal liberty. They did not end the proceedings recorded the following year, when more than 1,000 Baháʼís remained imprisoned, detained, under house arrest or entangled in hearings and summonses. ^[5][7][8]

Baháʼís’ situation illustrates the lasting consequences of the Islamic Republic’s founding choices. The community’s nineteenth-century Iranian roots remain, but its faith receives no constitutional recognition, and its institutions lost legal standing after the revolution. Later measures have reached from national policy to individual homes, classrooms, businesses and graves. The persistence of Baháʼí religious life in Iran sits alongside sustained state efforts to restrict it. Understanding the persecution therefore requires attention to both the historical shift after 1979 and the specific decisions through which officials continue to deny believers the ability to worship, study, work and hold property on equal terms. ^{[3][4][7][8][12]}