In the lexicon of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini often invoked the concept of “Islam-e ناب محمدی” – commonly translated as “the Pure Islam of Muhammad.” This term signifies what Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei consider the authentic, uncorrupted Islam practiced and preached by the Prophet Muhammad, as opposed to versions they deem compromised. Since 1979, Iran’s leaders have used “Pure Muhammadan Islam” as an ideological touchstone to legitimize their theocratic government and rally support at home and abroad. This analysis explores the origins of this concept, its intertwining with the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), and how it has been employed as a tool of political legitimacy. It also examines Khomeini’s stark contrast between “Pure Islam” and what he derisively labeled “American Islam,” the term’s influence on Iran’s domestic and foreign policy, and its reception in the broader Islamic world. Comparative perspectives will highlight how different Islamic movements define “true Islam” in ways that diverge from Khomeini’s vision. The aim is to provide an academic yet accessible overview, supported by historical and contemporary sources, of how “Pure Islam of Muhammad” became a rallying cry and governing principle in post-revolutionary Iran.
Origins and Ideological Foundations of “Pure Islam of Muhammad”
The notion of returning to a “pure” form of Islam predates Khomeini, but his interpretation was rooted in a unique historical and ideological context. In Twelver Shi’a tradition, clerical quietism – the idea that clergy should generally avoid direct political rule until the return of the Hidden Imam – had prevailed for centuries. Khomeini’s innovation was to break from this quietism and argue that establishing an Islamic government was not only permissible but required to implement true Islam. While formulating his theory in exile during the late 1960s, Khomeini drew on Islamic history and anti-colonial thought. Scholars note that Khomeini’s 1970 treatise “Islamic Government” (Hokumat-e Islami) reconceptualized an old Shi’a doctrine of limited guardianship into a mandate for clerical rule. He asserted that God did not intend Islam to be merely a private faith; rather, Islam provides a comprehensive socio-political order that must be enforced by those who best understand it – the Islamic jurists.
Importantly, Khomeini’s call for a return to “pure” Islam was influenced by broader Islamist currents across the Muslim world. His writings show the imprint of Sunni revivalist ideas. For example, an academic review notes that Khomeini was influenced by Rashid Rida’s early 20th-century advocacy of restoring the Caliphate and purifying Islam from foreign influence. Rida had emphasized salafiyya reform and the need for an ummah-wide revival of true Islamic governance; Khomeini’s own vision of “pure Islam” echoed these themes, adapted to Shi’a terminology. Indeed, Khomeini’s insistence on Islam-e ناب محمدی (pure Muhammadī Islam) can be seen as part of a broader anti-colonial Islamist impulse to strip away what he viewed as Western or monarchical corruptions of the faith. Domestically, thinkers like Ali Shariati helped set the stage for this mindset. Shariati, a lay Islamic leftist, popularized the notion that Islam must be a revolutionary force for the oppressed, turning every place into a Karbala and every day into Ashura. Khomeini channeled these ideas into a clerical framework – championing the downtrodden (mostazafin) and opposing both Eastern communist and Western capitalist domination in the name of Islam. By the time of the 1979 Revolution, “Pure Islam of Muhammad” had become for Khomeini a slogan encapsulating a return to prophetic justice, resistance to tyranny, and the fusion of spiritual and political life.
“Pure Islam” and Wilayat al-Faqih
Central to Khomeini’s conception of pure Islam is the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih, or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. This doctrine, now enshrined in Iran’s constitution, holds that a senior Islamic jurist (faqih) should serve as the supreme leader and guardian of the Muslim community, especially in the absence of the Shi’a messianic figure (the Hidden Imam). Khomeini’s thesis was straightforward: only a government led by Islamic scholars could properly implement Sharia (Islamic law) and preserve the true Islam that the Prophet Muhammad practiced. In practice, Wilayat al-Faqih became the institutional mechanism through which “Pure Muhammadan Islam” would be safeguarded in the Iranian state.
Under Khomeini’s leadership and later Khamenei’s, Wilayat al-Faqih is presented as the shield against deviation from Islam’s authentic path. Ayatollah Khamenei has argued that practicing “pure Islam” is effectively impossible without an Islamic government to enforce it. In a 2010 speech, Khamenei noted that “Pure Islam was our magnanimous Imam’s constant concern” and that if a country’s political system isn’t based on Islamic thought and Sharia, “it is impossible for Islam to genuinely fight local and global oppressors and bullies”. In other words, only a Sharia-based state led by a righteous jurist can fulfill Islam’s mandate to establish justice. This intertwining of religion and state contrasts sharply with secular governance models; indeed, Khomeini explicitly rejected secular democracy as incompatible with pure Islam. He believed the Prophet had effectively bequeathed governance to the ‘ulama’, and thus any separation of mosque and state was a betrayal of Islam’s comprehensive message. The doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih operationalized this belief by granting the Supreme Leader veto power over all laws and policies, ensuring that “Pure Islam” (as defined by the ruling jurist) guides the nation’s course.
Historically, this was a radical departure. Earlier Shi’a jurists like Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (18th century) had talked about clerical authority in limited terms (judicial, guardianship over widows/orphans, etc.), but Khomeini expanded it to full governmental authority. By doing so, he positioned the Iranian Revolution not just as a political upheaval but as a religious revival – a restoration of the Prophet’s own model of governance. This helps explain why Iranian officials often describe the Islamic Republic as “the government of Imam Muhammad” in spirit. Khomeini’s theory effectively merged theological legitimacy with political power, providing a divine justification for the Supreme Leader’s authority and for the revolutionary state’s policies.
Political Legitimacy and Governance in Iran
From its inception, the Islamic Republic has invoked “Pure Islam of Muhammad” to legitimize its rule and policy decisions. Khomeini and his circle used this concept to distinguish their revolution from other movements and to discredit opponents as enemies of true Islam. A telling example comes from Khomeini’s 1988 “Charter of the Clergy” (manshur-e ruhaniyat), a document in which he admonished certain clerics for betraying the revolution. He warned that “at the religious seminaries, there are individuals who are engaged in activities against the revolution and the pure Islam (Persian: اسلام ناب محمدی)…. The first and most significant move [by the enemy] is the induction of the slogan of separation of religion from politics.”. Here, Khomeini explicitly ties pure Islam to the revolutionary political project. Those clerics who advocated quietism or who dissented from Khomeini’s politicized Islam were cast as working “against…pure Islam,” implying they had deviated from the Prophet’s path. By contrast, Khomeini positioned himself and his followers as the sole representatives of authentic Shi’ism and true Islam in Iran. This rhetorical move was instrumental in undercutting the credibility of rival ayatollahs (such as Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who was sidelined and punished) and in rallying the Iranian public around the new regime.
In governance, “Pure Muhammadan Islam” has been used to justify both ideological and practical policies. Khomeini prioritized certain Islamic tenets – social justice, support for the oppressed, anti-corruption – as core to pure Islam, and these priorities translated into state rhetoric and programs. The Islamic Republic’s constitution itself is founded on Khomeini’s concept of Velayat-e Faqih and aspires to implement Quranic law in all facets of life. Laws enforcing hijab (Islamic dress), Islamic penal codes, and the Islamization of education and culture were all justified as measures to align Iran with Islam-e nab-e Muhammadi. For instance, in the early 1980s the regime launched a “Cultural Revolution” to purge secular and Western influences from universities, shutting them down for years to overhaul curricula. The Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance was tasked with overseeing media and the arts to ensure they conformed to Islamic values and revolutionary principles. Such policies were portrayed as necessary to purify society – to cleanse Iran of the moral laxity and subservience to foreign (un-Islamic) ways that the Shah’s era had, in the revolutionaries’ view, engendered.
Ayatollah Khamenei, since taking the Supreme Leader post in 1989, has continued in the same vein, frequently invoking the legacy of “pure Islam” to solidify political legitimacy. He has argued that protecting the Islamic system is the foremost duty of all Muslims because it is the vessel for preserving true Islam: “Safeguarding the Islamic Republic is the most important obligation because protecting Islam – in the true sense of the word – depends on safeguarding the political system of the Islamic Republic”. This sentiment, repeatedly expressed in speeches, elevates loyalty to the state as a religious obligation. It blurs the line between faith and patriotism, effectively sacralizing the organs of the Islamic Republic. In sum, the term “Pure Islam of Muhammad” has been a powerful tool for Iran’s leaders to claim a higher moral ground. It frames their political authority as derived from divine authority, portrays their critics as not just dissenters but heretics or stooges of imperialism, and justifies domestic policies as necessary steps toward an ideal Islamic society envisioned by the Prophet.
“Pure Islam” vs. “American Islam” – Khomeini’s Defining Dichotomy
One of Khomeini’s most famous usages of “Pure Muhammadī Islam” was in contrast to what he scornfully called “American Islam.” This phrase encapsulated, in his view, everything inauthentic or compromised about other versions of Islam, especially those convenient to Western interests or oppressive rulers. Khomeini described American Islam as a “fake Islam” designed to dupe Muslims by preaching apolitical quietism and acquiescence to tyranny. In a vivid characterization, he listed the traits of American Islam: “the Islam of capitalism, the Islam of the arrogant, the Islam of the wealthy… the Islam of hypocrisy… the Islam of the aristocracy, the Islam of Abu Sufyan… Islam of humiliation and misery, Islam of deception and compromise… Islam of capital and the rule of capitalists over the oppressed… Islam of prosperity and luxury”. Each epithet in this litany was meant to invoke either corrupt modern practices or infamous enemies of the Prophet (Abu Sufyan, for example, symbolizes hypocritical Meccan elites in Islamic history). By stringing them together, Khomeini painted American Islam as a diametric opposite to the Prophet’s Islam of piety, justice, and resistance.
What exactly did Khomeini mean by “American Islam”? In essence, he was targeting Muslim regimes and ideologies that, in his eyes, separated religion from real-world injustices. He accused them of reducing Islam to empty rituals or personal piety while aligning with oppressive powers. For Khomeini, “American Islam” was typified by those Muslim leaders who were allied to the United States or the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and who did not challenge global arrogance (estekbar) or stand up for the oppressed. Such an Islam, he argued, might have the outer trappings of the faith but lacked its soul. It “stands in opposition to pure Mohammedan Islam”, which for Khomeini integrated spirituality with governance and struggle.
Ayatollah Khamenei has maintained this dichotomy. In 2010 he defined American Islam as “ceremonial Islam, an Islam that is indifferent in the face of oppression” – in other words, a nominal Islam that doesn’t mind if injustice prevails. By contrast, Pure Islam in the Khomeinist sense is militant in defense of truth and the deprived. Khomeini’s famous slogan “Neither East, Nor West – Islamic Republic” underscored that his revolution would steer an independent path, rejecting both the U.S. and Soviet models in favor of Islamic governance. In Khomeini’s final will and political testament (1989), he repeatedly warned of “American Islam” as a threat, urging future generations to guard against those who promote a depoliticized or pro-Western interpretation of the faith. The Iranian clergy often expound on this theme in Friday sermons and media, explaining that Islam-e Amerikayi (American Islam) is any version of Islam that yields to imperialism or Zionism, whereas Islam-e ناب Muhammadi demands unwavering opposition to them.
This framing has served multiple purposes. Internationally, it provided a sharp propaganda tool during the revolutionary regime’s formative years. It allowed Iran’s leaders to claim the mantle of leadership of the Muslim world by implying that other Muslim nations’ leaders (especially U.S.-aligned monarchies or secular governments) were not following “real Islam.” Domestically, it reinforced the moral imperative of political engagement and vigilance among the populace: to be a good Muslim in the Islamic Republic meant rejecting the lure of an easy, apolitical faith and instead embracing the challenges of revolutionary Islam. The “Pure Islam vs. American Islam” dichotomy thus remains a cornerstone of Iranian revolutionary ideology, continually invoked in state discourse to contrast Iran’s Islamic system with both Western secularism and what they consider the pseudo-Islam of complacent Muslim rulers.
Impact on Domestic Policy and Society
The ideological framework of Pure Muhammadan Islam has deeply influenced Iran’s domestic policies and social norms since 1979. Guided by the belief that they must reconstruct society according to the Prophet’s model, Khomeini and his successors undertook sweeping changes in law, education, and culture. Islamization of Law: One of the immediate post-revolution tasks was replacing the Shah’s secular-oriented laws with Islamic ones. Alcohol was banned, interest/usury was removed from banking (at least nominally), and hodud punishments from Sharia (for crimes like adultery, theft, etc.) were incorporated into Iran’s penal code. The rationale was to cleanse Iran of un-Islamic practices and ensure that governance adhered to shar’ia, a key facet of “practicing pure Islam” in society. Khomeini’s government also imposed mandatory veiling (hijab) for women in 1981, arguing that modest dress was an Islamic virtue that the state must uphold to foster an ethical, Islamic atmosphere.
Cultural Revolution and Education: As noted, Iran launched a Cultural Revolution (1980-1983) that shut down universities and purged leftist or Western liberal influences. When universities reopened, the curricula – especially in humanities and social sciences – were revised to align with Islamic values. To this day, Iranian schools and universities include mandatory courses in Islamic theology and the thought of Imam Khomeini. The intent has been to raise new generations with a “pure Islamic” worldview. The state also closely monitors media, literature, and the arts via the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance. Books or films deemed contrary to Islamic principles (for instance, those seen as promoting “Western immorality” or religious dissent) are censored or banned. All these measures stem from the conviction that Islam-e nab-e Muhammadi must pervade public life, not just private devotion.
Social Justice and the Oppressed: A major theme in Khomeini’s concept of pure Islam is siding with the oppressed (mostazafin) against the oppressors (mostakberin). Domestically, this translated into a populist tone in economic and social policies. Khomeini often railed against wealth inequality and urged officials to live simply, echoing the Prophet’s concern for the poor. Institutions like the Bonyads (charitable trusts/ex-state foundations) were set up or expanded to provide aid to war veterans, the poor, and rural communities. While Iran’s economic record has been mixed, the rhetoric of governing in the interest of the dispossessed has been a constant refrain, used to legitimize the regime’s Islamic authenticity. For example, subsidies on fuel and bread were long justified as helping the underprivileged in an Islamic spirit of justice. Khomeini himself lived relatively modestly, and that image was cultivated to show that in an Islamic system, unlike in the Shah’s time, leaders would not wallow in luxury.
At the same time, the pure Islam framework has been cited to justify political repression. Just as Khomeini denounced “sanctimonious clerics” who opposed the revolution, the regime has labeled various dissidents – from secular liberals to Marxists to religious minorities Bahá’ís – as threats to Islam. Opponents are often accused of being agents of foreign powers or of promoting moral corruption, thereby implicitly or explicitly classed under “American Islam” or anti-Islam activity. By defining the Islamic Republic as the embodiment of pure Islam, the authorities cast dissent as not just treason but impiety. This conflation of sin and crime has had profound implications for human rights in Iran. Laws against blasphemy, “spreading corruption on earth,” or “enmity against God” are used against political protesters and ideological deviants. The net effect is that “defending the revolution” and “defending Islam” become synonymous in Iran’s political lexicon.
In summary, Khomeini’s Pure Islam of Muhammad ideal gave the nascent Islamic Republic a mission to transform Iranian society. It provided justification for far-reaching changes that align daily life with a certain interpretation of Islam – from what people wear and learn in school to how justice is meted out. It also sanctified the state’s heavy role in guiding public morals and suppressing un-Islamic influences. While many Iranians have embraced aspects of this (e.g. valuing Islamic culture or pride in independence), others chafe under the stricter impositions – a tension that defines much of Iran’s post-revolution domestic scene.
Foreign Policy and “Exporting” the Revolution
The concept of Pure Muhammadan Islam has not stopped at Iran’s borders – it has directly informed the Islamic Republic’s foreign relations and its self-proclaimed leadership role in the Muslim world. Khomeini’s Iran positioned itself as the vanguard of an Islamist uprising against global injustice, and thus it sought to “export the revolution.” This did not necessarily mean fomenting identical uprisings everywhere, but rather supporting like-minded movements and promoting the idea of Islamic governance.
A key element of Iranian foreign policy has been solidarity with the “oppressed” in other nations, whom Khomeini saw as victims of imperialism or local tyrants. This is often couched in Islamic terms. For example, Iran champions the Palestinian cause vigorously, casting it as a jihad of the oppressed (Palestinians) against the oppressor (Israel, backed by the U.S.). This stance is directly tied to Khomeini’s vision of pure Islam requiring opposition to Zionism and Western colonialism; hence Iran funds and arms groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and had ties to Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, presenting itself as fulfilling an Islamic duty to liberate Jerusalem. Tehran’s leaders often refer to Israel as an illegitimate regime and invoke religious imagery of jihad when speaking about its eventual removal, again highlighting the mix of political and religious in their worldview.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) further solidified the regime’s narrative that it was defending pure Islam. Khomeini framed Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist Iraq as an aggressor doing the bidding of superpowers to crush the Islamic revolution. During that war, Iran popularized the slogan “Neither East nor West” and emphasized revolutionary Islamic fervor as its strength. Notably, Iran’s war propaganda often included themes of Karbala and martyrdom, connecting the 7th-century tragedy of Imam Hussein (a core Shi’a symbol of fighting tyranny) to the modern struggle. This religious mobilization helped rally volunteers for the front and justify the war’s continuation. Khomeini even stated at one point that the war was a blessing that preserved the revolution’s fervor. Ultimately, the war was portrayed as a battle between Khomeini’s Islam-e Muhammadi and a neo-Jahili (ignorant) coalition of world powers and Saddam – reinforcing the idea that Iran was the standard-bearer of true Islam under siege by false Muslims and their patrons.
Beyond the region, Iran’s revolutionary government sought to inspire Islamic movements globally. It established institutions like the Al-Mustafa International University in Qom to train foreign students in its brand of Shi’a Islam. It also broadcast radio and TV programs in various languages promoting Khomeini’s teachings. In countries with significant Shi’a populations – Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria – Iran cultivated networks of clerics and activists, some of whom openly pledged allegiance to Khomeini and later Khamenei as the “Leader of the Ummah.” In 1982, Iran’s agents helped form Hezbollah in Lebanon, a Shi’a militant-political organization that explicitly follows the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih and regards Khamenei as its highest authority. The export of revolution was thus sometimes quite literal: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives were active in training and supporting militant groups that aligned with Iran’s vision of Islamic governance. Iran touted these efforts as spreading the Pure Islam of Muhammad, claiming, for example, that Khomeini had “revived and raised the flag of Islam” worldwide, inspiring Muslims from Bosnia to Africa.
However, Iran’s promotion of its ideology often exacerbated sectarian tensions. Sunni-dominated countries generally viewed Iran’s revolutionary proselytizing with alarm. To many Sunni governments (and to some Sunni Islamists), Khomeini’s ideology was a Shi’a particularism dressed up as universal Islam. During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states aggressively countered Iranian influence by funding Sunni scholars and groups to assert their own Islamic narratives. The term “Iranian expansionism” became common in Arab political discourse, and Iran’s support for militant proxies has contributed to ongoing conflicts (e.g., in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria). Still, Tehran maintains that its foreign policy is principled, not expansionist – that it supports Muslim causes and other nations’ sovereignty in line with Islamic ideals, while opposing U.S. hegemony (often personified in the slogan “Great Satan” for America). The Pure Islam concept gives Iran a moralizing framework: it claims Iran’s alliances (whether with Syria’s Alawite regime or Venezuelan socialists) are based on fighting oppression, and its enmities (with the U.S., Israel, Saddam’s Iraq, Saudi Wahhabis, etc.) are because those forces represent injustice or “un-Islamic” tyranny.
In effect, Khomeini’s ideology turned Iran into both a self-defined Islamic revolutionary power and a sectarian Shi’a power. Balancing those identities has been a challenge. Iran insists its revolution was Islamic not Shiite per se – pointing to Quranic, pan-Islamic rhetoric – and it has had some success winning admiration beyond Shi’a circles (for instance, among certain Sunni Islamists in Palestine and even Malaysia who saw Iran standing up to the West). But the Shi’a character of Wilayat al-Faqih and Iran’s direct appeal to Shi’a minorities abroad have provoked suspicion and backlash, limiting the universal adoption of Khomeini’s “pure Islam” ideal in the broader Muslim world.
Reception and Criticism in the Wider Islamic World
Khomeini’s interpretation of “Pure Islam” has been polarizing among Muslims globally. In Shi’a communities, especially those long oppressed or marginalized, Khomeini became a hero to many. Lebanese Shi’as, as mentioned, formed Hezbollah and embraced Khomeinism as liberation theology. Shi’a activists in Iraq (under Saddam’s dictatorship) quietly looked to Khomeini for inspiration, and after Saddam’s fall in 2003, pro-Iran parties in Iraq emerged that celebrate Khomeini’s legacy. Even in places like Pakistan and Nigeria, Shi’a minority movements adopted Khomeini’s likeness on posters and chanted slogans from the Iranian Revolution. They saw in “Pure Muhammadan Islam” a path to assert their rights and dignity, often in societies where Sunni dominance was the norm.
However, traditional Shi’a religious authorities (the maraji‘ who did not involve themselves in politics) had misgivings. Grand Ayatollahs in Najaf, such as Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei in the 1980s and Ali al-Sistani more recently, never endorsed Wilayat al-Faqih. They maintained that clerics should guide morally but not govern directly. Some even implicitly criticized Iran’s system by continuing to teach that the role of jurists as guardians was limited. In Khomeini’s lifetime, figures like Grand Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Iran and others abroad were silenced or marginalized for questioning the fusion of religious and state authority. Thus within Shi’ism, a rift emerged: Khomeinists vs. Quietists. Each side claimed to represent true Islam – Khomeinists arguing that quietism was a dereliction of duty against injustice, quietists warning that political power could corrupt the religion.
In the Sunni world, the reactions ranged from admiration to outright hostility. On one hand, many Sunni Islamists cheered the toppling of the Western-backed Shah and saw Iran’s stance against the U.S. and Israel as courageous. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, initially praised Iran’s revolution (despite theological differences) as a victory for Islam. Some Sunni scholars like Yusuf al-Qaradawi in the early years spoke of Sunni-Shi’a unity against common enemies. Khomeini himself attempted to bridge sectarian gaps – he declared the day of the Prophet’s birthday as “Islamic Unity Week” and forbade disparaging Sunni revered figures (a fatwa Khamenei has reiterated).
These gestures were meant to frame Iran’s cause as an Islamic one, not a sectarian one.
On the other hand, sectarian mistrust and geopolitical competition quickly eroded much of that good will. Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi establishment, which views many Shi’a practices as heretical, was deeply unnerved by 1979 – not only did the Iranian Revolution install a Shi’a theocracy next door, but the same year Sunni extremists seized Mecca’s Grand Mosque, partially inspired by anti-monarchical Islamist ideas. The Saudi monarchy and clerics doubled down on portraying themselves as the true protectors of Islam (specifically Sunni orthodoxy) and often cast Iran’s clerics as Safavids (a historical slur implying Persian/Shi’a expansionism) rather than genuine Islamic leaders. Throughout the 1980s, Saudi and Iranian rhetoric battled for the mantle of Islamic legitimacy: Iran denounced the “puppet regimes” and “American Islam” of Gulf monarchs, while Saudi-allied outlets painted Khomeini as a dangerous innovator exploiting religion for power.
Many Sunni scholars – even those not politically aligned with Saudis – had theological objections to Khomeini’s claims. The idea of Wilayat al-Faqih has no clear basis in Sunni thought, which traditionally doesn’t vest religious authority in a formal clergy hierarchy in the same way. Some Sunni thinkers accused Khomeini of politicizing Islam to an extreme, arguing that forcing religion via state power could lead to oppression contradicting Islamic principles. For instance, prominent South Asian Sunni theologian Abul Ala Maududi, who himself advocated an Islamic state, nevertheless differed in approach and had passed away by 1979, but his party in Pakistan (Jamaat-e-Islami) had mixed views on Iran. Over time, especially after Iran’s involvement in regional conflicts (like support for Assad in Syria’s civil war), even Sunni Islamists who once admired Iran became more critical, viewing its policies as driven by Shi’a sectarian interests rather than pan-Islamic unity.
From the standpoint of other Islamic movements or states, Khomeini’s “Pure Islam” was just one interpretation among many – and a contentious one at that. For example, the Salafi-jihadi groups such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS have their own vision of purifying Islam, which involves resurrecting a Sunni Caliphate and strictly enforcing Sharia as they interpret it. These groups vehemently reject Shi’ism altogether; ISIS in its propaganda called Shi’as apostates and singled out Khomeini’s system as taghut (idolatrous tyranny). Ironically, both ISIS and the Islamic Republic claim to represent the “pure” Islam of the Prophet, yet they are mortal enemies – a testament to how drastically visions of “true Islam” can diverge.
Countries like Turkey and Malaysia offer yet different models: Turkey’s AKP under Erdogan mixes electoral democracy with Islamic-leaning politics (often touted as “conservative democracy”) without a jurist guardian, and Malaysia has its own blend of Islam with multiethnic politics. These models don’t seek to emulate Khomeini, and their leaders don’t typically use the term “Pure Islam of Muhammad” in the Khomeini sense; instead, they speak of modern Islamic governance that may incorporate aspects of democracy and pluralism – approaches Khomeini might label as influenced by the West.
In summary, while Khomeini’s ideological project undeniably energized Islamist movements and reshaped Shi’a political identity, its claim to exclusive authenticity has been contested. Iran’s notion of “Pure Muhammadan Islam” finds enthusiastic adherents in certain circles (mainly among Shi’a revolutionaries and Iran-aligned groups), but it has also faced rejection – sometimes violently – from Sunni establishments, secular Muslims, and rival Islamist ideologues. This contest over religious legitimacy continues to play out in Middle East politics and inter-Islamic dialogues to this day.
Comparative Perspectives: Competing Visions of “True Islam”
Khomeini’s vision invites comparison with other Islamic movements and states that also claim to follow Islam as originally intended by the Prophet. These comparisons highlight both overlaps and sharp differences:
- Saudi-Wahhabi Islam vs. Khomeini’s Islam: Both claim purity but define it differently. Wahhabism (originating in 18th-century Arabia) sought to purge Islam of what it considered later accretions and return to the tauhid (monotheism) of the Prophet’s era. Modern Saudi Arabia, founded on a Wahhabi alliance, enforces strict Sunni Islamic law in social life (gender segregation, religious policing, etc.), which superficially echoes Iran’s enforcement of Shi’a Islamic norms. However, politically, Saudi Arabia is a hereditary monarchy that for decades had a close alliance with the United States. Khomeini would label the Saudi model an example of “American Islam” – a regime that uses Islamic language but, in Iran’s view, serves the interests of “arrogant powers” and fails to champion the oppressed. Saudi leaders, conversely, see themselves as custodians of the Two Holy Mosques and promoters of a depoliticized Islam focused on ritual and creed, implicitly rejecting Iran’s revolutionary approach. The rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is often framed by each as a struggle of true Islam against the other’s false version, though in geopolitical terms it’s also about regional power and sectarian identity.
- Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni Political Islam: The Sunni Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna) share with Khomeini the goal of an Islamic government and law. The Brotherhood, however, envisioned achieving this through grassroots social work, education, and eventually democratic participation (when possible), rather than clerical rule. Sayyid Qutb, a Brotherhood ideologue, wrote about Jahiliyya (ignorance) in modern Muslim societies and the need for a vanguard to restore Islamic rule – concepts not far from Khomeini’s discourse of Western cultural invasion and the need for an Islamic revolution. Indeed, Qutb was one of the first to use the term “American Islam” in the 1950s, critiquing U.S.-friendly Islam well before Khomeini. However, the Brotherhood’s model doesn’t invest authority in a supreme jurist. When Egypt briefly had an elected Brotherhood-led government (2012–2013 under Mohamed Morsi), it sought to incorporate Sharia via legislation but within a republic framework and without vilayat-e faqih. Khomeini criticized such approaches as too compromising – he believed only unequivocal clerical leadership ensures fidelity to Islam, whereas Brotherhood-influenced parties have accepted pluralism and even secular opposition as part of politics. The Brotherhood, for its part, has at times praised Iran’s defiance of the West, but Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shi’a divides, along with Iran’s backing of the Syrian regime (which the Brotherhood opposed), have limited strategic cooperation.
- “Islamic democracy” and Modernists: Some Muslim-majority states and thinkers advocate a synthesis of Islamic values and democratic governance – for example, the post-1998 government in Indonesia spoke of “Reformasi” with respect for Pancasila (national ideology) that includes monotheism, or Tunisia’s Ennahda party calling itself “Muslim democrats.” These perspectives argue that the essence of Islam (justice, shura consultation, etc.) can thrive under democratic institutions, human rights, and without clerical supremacy. Khomeini’s camp is skeptical of these models, often viewing them as dilutions of Islam to please Western sensibilities – precisely the kind of approach “American Islam” would take, they argue, by putting popular sovereignty or liberal rights above divine law. In 1989, when some Iranian reformists floated the term “Islamic Democratic Republic,” Khomeini angrily rejected it, dropping “democratic” from the official name. Thus, Iran’s hardline ideologues often critique Muslim modernists as being too influenced by secularism.
- Militant Jihadist Caliphates: Groups like the Taliban (in Afghanistan) or ISIS (in Iraq-Syria) impose very conservative interpretations of Sharia and claim to recreate the era of the Prophet or early caliphs. The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate (1996–2001, and again since 2021) is a Sunni Deobandi-influenced government that strictly enforces Sharia but is ethnically Pashtun-led and wasn’t about global revolution. Iran’s relationship with the Taliban has been uneasy – in the 1990s it was hostile (the Taliban killed Iranian diplomats and persecuted Afghan Shi’a), though in recent years Iran has pragmatically engaged with the Taliban. Iran likely sees the Taliban as practicing an ignorant form of Islam in terms of their harsh treatment of women and minorities, but it doesn’t publicly challenge their religious legitimacy too much now, focusing instead on diplomacy. ISIS, on the other hand, is viewed by Iran as a direct terrorist enemy. ISIS views Shi’ism as deviant and reviles Iran; Iran has militarily fought ISIS via proxies in Iraq and Syria. From an ideological lens, ISIS represents an extreme “puritanical” Sunni vision that completely negates Shi’a claims – a far cry from Khomeini’s ecumenical overtures. Both ISIS and Iran use slogans about following the Prophet’s path, but ISIS’s caliphate model and Iran’s jurist-guardian model are incompatible and mutually delegitimizing.
- Secular and Alternative Muslim States: It’s also useful to compare Iran’s ideology with secular-nationalist states in the Muslim world (like Ba’athist Iraq or Kemalist Turkey historically) which relegated Islam to a cultural or secondary role. Khomeini’s entire project was a reaction against secular nationalism, which he believed had failed the Muslim world by imitating Westphalian models and sidelining faith. Throughout the 20th century, many Muslim nations pursued Westernization and nationalism, marginalizing Islamic politics – Khomeini labeled those elites as sell-outs to either Western “Great Satan” or Eastern (Soviet) atheism. The Islamic Revolution’s success emboldened Islamic movements to challenge secular regimes (e.g. in Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq cited Islam to justify his military rule in 1977; in Sudan, an Islamic revolution occurred in 1989). Yet, secular governments and many urban educated Muslims remain wary of Iran’s theocratic example, pointing to Iran’s internal repression and the Iran-Iraq war’s huge toll as cautionary tales of mixing religion and state. Iranian leaders retort that secular regimes produced their own tyrannies and corrupt elites, whereas Iran endeavors (at least in theory) to have pious leadership accountable to God.
Over four decades after the Iranian Revolution, “The Pure Islam of Muhammad” as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeini continues to shape Iran’s identity and policies under Ali Khamenei. It originated as a revolutionary ideal – a call to restore Islam’s original justice, purity, and resistance to oppression – and became the foundation of a new political system claiming divine legitimacy. Through the principle of Wilayat al-Faqih, Khomeini and Khamenei have argued that only under a guardianship of the jurist can society truly emulate the Prophet’s governance and fend off the influences of “American Islam,” which they equate with passivity and subservience to tyrants. This ideological framework has been a double-edged sword. Domestically, it galvanized tremendous support among those yearning for dignity and Islamic values, and it justified transforming Iran’s laws and institutions. It sacralized Iran’s political order – making the defense of the Islamic Republic synonymous with defending the faith itself – but also suppressed pluralism and dissent in the name of religious purity. Internationally, Khomeini’s Pure Islam inspired Islamist movements and gave Tehran a grand mission, projecting influence through religious soft power and hard power. Yet it also provoked fear and resistance, fueling sectarian divides and conflicts with neighbors who reject Iran’s claim as the arbiter of Islamic authenticity.
From an academic perspective, the term “Pure Islam of Muhammad” highlights how contested the notion of “pure” religion can be, especially when intertwined with state power. Khomeini’s usage was at once theological, utopian, and political – a rallying cry that distinguished his faction from both secularists and from Muslims he deemed compromised. Journalistically, understanding this term is key to deciphering Iranian official rhetoric: when Khamenei rails against cultural infiltration or extols jihad in speeches, he is invoking the same paradigm of an Islam that must be kept “pure” and combative. For the broader Islamic world, Khomeini’s vision remains one of several competing narratives about how Islam should guide public life. Whether one sees it as a blueprint for empowerment or an instrument of authoritarian control largely depends on one’s political and sectarian standpoint. What is clear is that “Pure Muhammadan Islam” in the Khomeinist sense has left an indelible mark on modern history – reasserting religion at the center of governance in Iran and altering the conversation about Islam’s role in politics far beyond Iran’s borders.
Sources
- Khamenei, Ali. “Leader’s View of Islamic Awakening” (June 4, 2010) – Khamenei.ir.
- Wikipedia: “American Islam (term)” – detailing Khomeini’s use of “American Islam” vs. “pure Mohammedan Islam.”
- Wikipedia: “Islamic fundamentalism in Iran” – includes excerpts from Khomeini’s Charter of the Clergy about enemies of the revolution and pure Islam.
- Hermann, Denis, et al. “Islamist Shi’ism” – Encyclopedia.pub (MDPI) – notes on Khomeini’s influences, including Rashid Rida’s impact on his call to pure Islam.
- MERIP Report (June 1980): “Khomeini: ‘We Shall Confront the World with Our Ideology'” – analysis of Khomeini’s political philosophy rejecting secular democracy.
- English translations of Khomeini’s writings and speeches, various (available via Al-Islam.org and other sources).
- Naser Ghobadzadeh & Shahram Akbarzadeh. “Religionization of politics in Iran: Shi’i seminaries as the bastion of resistance,” Middle Eastern Studies 56, no.4 (2020) – discusses Khomeini’s integration of religion and state.
- Keddie, Nikki. Iran and the Surrounding World (University of Washington Press, 2002) – historical context on Khomeini’s ideology.
- Statements by Ayatollah Khamenei on “American Islam” (2010) and by Khomeini (various, as cited in secondary sources).
- Ervand Abrahamian. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic – provides analysis of populist and socialist influences on Khomeini’s thought.
- Reuters (Feb 2019): “Iran’s first president says Khomeini betrayed 1979 Islamic revolution” – an opposing view from inside the revolution’s early elite.
