TEHRAN – In a rare public admission, senior members of Iran’s governing elite have raised urgent concerns about the country’s rapidly declining birthrate and its potential to undermine the long-term viability of the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities. At a high-level conference held to mark International Health Day, Ayatollah Hosseini Bushehri, prominent cleric and leader within Iran’s religious establishment, warned that without a sufficient population base, the regime’s arsenal and regional military aspirations could be rendered meaningless. Although many observers have noted Iran’s robust investments in missile technology and regional proxy networks, such warnings highlight a fundamental, internal challenge—demographics—that could threaten the foundation of Iran’s national security strategy.
Iran’s Demographic Crisis: From Post-Revolution Boom to Population Decline
The roots of Iran’s current demographic challenge stretch back decades. Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran experienced a population boom, driven by government incentives and the need for economic and military recovery after years of monarchy rule and the devastating Iran-Iraq war. However, by the late 1980s and early 1990s, concerns about overpopulation and unemployment led to a policy U-turn. The regime implemented one of the most comprehensive state-led family planning initiatives in the region, urging families to limit childbearing. These policies succeeded beyond expectations: the country’s fertility rate plunged from an estimated 6.5 children per woman in the early 1980s to below the replacement level of 2.1 by the early 2000s.
Today, Iran’s fertility rate has further dropped, hovering around 1.7 children per woman according to governmental and independent demographic sources. With modern urbanization, economic pressures, and shifting cultural values taking hold, the trend shows no sign of reversing. The nation’s Statistical Center predicts that Iran’s population—currently estimated at just under 90 million—will begin shrinking within two decades, with the proportion of citizens over 65 expected to more than double by 2050. This looming reality has prompted a renewed sense of urgency among Iran’s political and military planners.
Strategic Consequences: Military Manpower in Jeopardy
The Islamic Republic’s unique security doctrine depends not only on technology and weapons manufacturing—areas in which Iran has heavily invested—but also on the ability to muster large numbers of soldiers. Unlike many of its adversaries, Iran relies on a conscript army model fueling both the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and conventional forces. A smaller, aging population threatens to upend this system, diminishing the pool of eligible recruits for both domestic defense and the projection of power through regional proxies such as Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria.
Senior regime figures, including those within the Assembly of Experts and the leadership of influential seminaries, are now openly worried that demographic shifts could blunt the effectiveness of Iran’s military machine. “The best weapons are useless if there is no one to use them,” Bushehri remarked, pointing to the essential role of human capital in Iran’s regional strategy. This is not a purely theoretical concern: military officials and think tanks have reported stagnation and even declines in enlistment rates, especially among urban youth, as economic uncertainty and ideological fatigue dampen enthusiasm for military service.
Impact on Regional Ambitions: The Human Factor in the ‘Axis of Resistance’
The consequences of Iran’s demographic crisis are likely to be felt beyond its borders. Iran’s model of regional influence—the so-called ‘Axis of Resistance’—relies on exporting manpower, ideological support, and military advisors to allied militias across the Middle East. As Iran’s youth population shrinks, its ability to supply and coordinate manpower for these networks may erode, undermining Tehran’s decade-long push to entrench itself from Lebanon to Yemen.
While Iranian officials publicly cite concerns about Western sanctions and technology transfers, this demographic challenge now looms as an equally serious, if not greater, obstacle to maintaining Iran’s ambitions. The regime has already begun exploring incentives for larger families and new population growth initiatives, but so far, results have been limited. Deep social and economic dissatisfaction, as well as growing demands for personal freedom and opportunity, continue to drive birthrates down.
Regional and Security Context: Iranian Military Buildup and Israel’s Response
Iran’s demographic anxieties come at a moment of heightened regional tension. The Islamic Republic’s ongoing military buildup, its support for anti-Israel terrorist organizations and proxy warfare, and its confrontation with Western states have made it a focal point of Middle East security policy. For Israel, Iran’s evolving demographic and internal dynamics are closely monitored, as any shift in the Islamic Republic’s ability to mobilize forces could alter the balance of power and influence ongoing campaigns against Iran-backed threats—including Hezbollah and the IRGC.
In the broader war led by Iran’s proxies, the crisis is stark: Hamas’s barbaric October 7, 2023 attack on Israeli civilians—planned and orchestrated with Iranian backing—demonstrated the regime’s willingness to sacrifice human lives for its ideological agenda. If demographic decline limits Iran’s ability to replenish terror operatives, it could constrain the Islamic Republic’s capacity to wage future proxy wars. Yet, with shifting tactics and deepening partnerships among remaining terror networks, the threat is unlikely to disappear entirely.
The Way Forward: Regime Survival and Popular Discontent
As Iranian leaders struggle to reverse falling birthrates, a larger question looms: can the regime balance its military ambitions with the realities of social change? Experts suggest that only a dramatic shift in economic confidence, public trust in government institutions, and genuine investment in civil society could revive national morale and reverse the trend. Otherwise, demographic pressures may ultimately force the Islamic Republic to reduce its foreign adventurism and refocus on the domestic front—something the ayatollahs have long resisted, even at the expense of internal stability.
Demographics, in the end, may prove a more formidable adversary to Iran’s regime than any outside enemy. As Israeli and Western security agencies assess the region’s trajectory, Iran’s shrinking base of young men will remain a critical factor in the calculations of war and peace in the Middle East.
