On Quds Day in the city of Qom, Iran, Nigerian students living in the Islamic Republic marched alongside thousands of others in state-orchestrated demonstrations that called for the destruction of Israel. These students are not mere spectators; they are part of an extensive, ideologically driven program operated by the Iranian regime to export its revolutionary message and recruit foreign operatives for its global terror network. Their attendance at these events exposes a systematic strategy by Tehran to cultivate loyalists well beyond its borders, using education, indoctrination, and direct influence to build a transnational infrastructure of militant activism.
The students hail from the Islamic Movement in Nigeria, a group founded and led by Ibrahim Zakzaky, which explicitly models itself on the Iranian Islamic Revolution. Supported financially and ideologically by Iran for decades, this movement operates as a proxy, mirroring the structure and objectives of Iran-backed entities such as Hezbollah. At the center of Iran’s outreach is Al-Mustafa International University in Qom, where these Nigerian students study religion under full scholarship from the Iranian regime. The university is well-documented as more than just a center for religious learning—it is a strategic organ for Iran’s soft power and covert force projection, blending theological education with ideological priming and clandestine recruitment.
Iran’s intent is clear: using Al-Mustafa, it grooms foreign youth in the tenets of Khomeinist revolution, then positions them as assets in their countries of origin. According to multiple intelligence reports and academic investigations, Al-Mustafa is closely linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Quds Force, both designated as terrorist organizations by the United States and many allies. University life provides recruits not just with indoctrination, but also with the operational discipline and covert networks necessary for future assignments—from propaganda efforts to material support for terror operations.
Allegations of terror network recruitment via Al-Mustafa have become increasingly substantiated. African and European intelligence services, alongside credible NGOs, have documented cases in which graduates of the university have returned to their home countries and initiated recruitment drives, organized protests against Western interests, or been directly involved in activities supporting the agenda of the IRGC and Quds Force. The Nigerian authorities have especially highlighted the university as a recruitment hub, uncovering plots linked to its alumni involving attempts to establish paramilitary camps, coordinate with militant groups, and funnel funds to subversive activities.
Iran’s global objectives are advanced through Quds Day itself—a politicized rally created by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979, designating the final Friday of Ramadan as a day of protest against Israel and the West. The event serves a dual purpose: projecting Iran’s ideological opposition to Israel, and providing a live platform for foreign students and visitors to demonstrate allegiance to the regime’s cause. With banners, speeches, and orchestrated chants, Quds Day communicates to the world that Iran’s fight is not confined to its own borders, but is part of an international campaign targeting Jews, Israelis, and democratic states.
Historical context is critical. Iran’s Quds Force oversees foreign missions and terror proxies in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and beyond, making its influence one of the principal drivers of instability and violence in the Middle East and Africa. The IRGC’s links to Al-Mustafa exemplify how the regime integrates soft power (education and ideology) with hard power (recruitment, financing, and terrorism) to expand its reach. Unlike Sunni jihadist groups that operate with visible violence, Iran’s model leverages linguistically and culturally fluent operatives who serve as community leaders, activists, or religious teachers—masking their role as facilitators of subversion.
Internationally, Israel and its partners have warned that failing to curb Tehran’s use of educational institutions risks enabling the creation of local networks hostile to Western and Israeli interests. American and European intelligence have traced several plots—foiled before execution—back to individuals radicalized through Iran’s universities. These findings challenge the notion that Quds Day protests and religious scholarships are benign, instead exposing the links between education, propaganda, and organized violence.
The response from affected countries has been mixed. Nigeria has periodically banned the activities of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria due to its violence and open allegiance to Tehran, though the movement’s ties to the university remain unchecked. Other African nations have expelled Iranian-trained clerics, citing evidence of their subversive activities. Meanwhile, the university continues to recruit in dozens of countries, particularly targeting developing nations susceptible to influence and internal division.
Critics of Israel often frame Quds Day as a rally for justice or a voice for the voiceless. This narrative ignores mounting evidence that the day is exploited by Iran as a tool to galvanize international support not for freedom, but for state-sponsored aggression and terror. The presence of Nigerian students in Qom, funded and monitored by the regime, is not an isolated phenomenon. It represents a strategic, institutionalized campaign—one that operates in parallel to armed terror, and is equally committed to undermining Israeli security, destabilizing governments, and advancing Iranian hegemony.
Ultimately, Al-Mustafa International University, its Nigerian students, and the Quds Day events provide a window into how the Iranian state engineers alliances, exports ideology, and manufactures the next generation of militant activists aligned with its objectives. Governments threatened by these activities must recalibrate their approach—treating Iranian-sponsored educational institutions as operational extensions of the regime’s terror network, demanding transparency, and implementing monitoring mechanisms to counter the threat at its root.
Quds Day, as observed in Qom and beyond, must be understood not as a gesture of compassion, but as an annual rehearsal for the machinery of terror and subversion. The Nigerian presence in the Iranian streets demonstrates that the war for influence is global, with educational institutions serving as its frontlines. Only by confronting this reality will Israel and its allies be able to address the deeper menace posed by Iran’s export of revolution, and defend themselves against the spread of its violent, destabilizing agenda.
