Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Esmail Qaani has repeatedly issued messages in Hebrew via online platforms, underscoring a new front in the information war against Israel. This series of attempts—often marked by the use of automated translation—signals a persistent Iranian strategy to leverage psychological warfare tools alongside conventional military and proxy attacks, as part of a broader campaign to destabilize Israel and further Tehran’s regional ambitions.
Digital Operations as a Force Multiplier
Since his appointment in 2020, Qaani has escalated the use of Hebrew-language provocations, particularly in the aftermath of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 massacre—the deadliest antisemitic atrocity since the Holocaust. Using platforms such as Telegram and Twitter (currently known as X), Qaani’s statements are aimed at Israeli audiences, seeking to foment fear, doubt, and division within Israeli society. These public messages, while often ridiculed for mistranslation, are components of a calculated psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign, deemed by Israeli defense analysts to be as consequential as kinetic attacks undertaken by Iranian-backed proxies.
Strategic Objectives and Iranian Doctrine
The IRGC-Quds Force, directed by Qaani, is tasked with advancing Iran’s regional influence through both military means and psychological subversion. Rooted in a doctrine that prioritizes the destruction of the State of Israel, Tehran employs a multi-pronged strategy against the Jewish State: arming and advising terrorist proxies such as Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Islamic Jihad; orchestrating international disinformation campaigns; and now, increasingly, direct psychological messaging in Hebrew. By targeting Israeli society in its own language, Iran seeks both to intimidate and to shape internal narratives during a time of continued conflict and uncertainty.
Israel’s Response: Cyber and Societal Resilience
Israel’s security services, including the National Cyber Directorate and IDF Unit 8200, continuously monitor and counter Iranian attempts at cognitive warfare. Authorities warn that while linguistic errors expose the limitations of these Iranian efforts, dismissing the strategic intent behind them would be perilous. The Ministry of Strategic Affairs and Military Intelligence Directorate categorize such activities as part of Iran’s broader effort to undermine Israeli morale and cultivate political or social friction. In response, Israel has enhanced digital literacy across the public sector and partnered with international allies, including the United States, to neutralize both online and offline threats.
The Axis of Resistance and its Digital Fronts
Qaani’s focus on Hebrew messaging is the digital expression of a well-developed regional ‘axis of resistance,’ which includes Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shi’a militias in Iraq and Syria. Following Iran’s direction, these groups coordinate kinetic attacks as well as psychological pressure campaigns through social media, incitement broadcasts, and disinformation targeting Israelis and international audiences alike. These ongoing efforts serve both tactical and symbolic roles—demonstrating Iranian reach while sowing confusion and anxiety.
Impact on Israeli Society and Policy
While many Israeli commentators have lampooned Qaani’s poor command of Hebrew, security officials caution that Iran’s persistent messaging contributes to a climate of psychological tension already heightened by near-daily rocket fire, the ongoing hostages crisis, and the staggering human toll of the conflict. The government has called for greater vigilance from media outlets and digital platforms in removing hostile content, while civil society groups continue to bolster public resilience to both misinformation and psychological intimidation. On the strategic level, Israel’s commitment to transparency, internal cohesion, and proactive countermeasures remains a cornerstone of its defense against Iranian digital subversion.
International Ramifications
Western governments, led by the United States, closely coordinate with Israel on cyber defense and PSYOP countermeasures, recognizing Israel as a front-line target for methods that could be exported to other democracies. Intelligence-sharing and joint training have been accelerated since October 2023, with officials highlighting the risk that tactics perfected in the Israeli arena may soon be leveraged to disrupt elections or social trust elsewhere.
Conclusion
The ongoing attempts by IRGC commander Esmail Qaani to issue messages in Hebrew reflect a wider evolution in Iran’s campaign against Israel: the weaponization of digital communication as a force multiplier in psychological warfare. Israel’s multifaceted response—combining technological innovation, public awareness, and international partnership—aims to defend not only against rocket attacks but also against the subtler assaults launched by hostile actors intent on undermining its sovereignty and resolve. As the conflict endures, vigilance in both the physical and digital domains remains essential for the preservation of Israel’s security and societal cohesion.
