Tehran, Iran – Iran faces one of its worst economic downturns in recent memory, with collapsing real incomes, rising staples prices, and mounting public disappointment in the Islamic Republic’s leadership. The country’s current turmoil—marked by acute shortages of essential goods including poultry—has brought renewed scrutiny to the system of political privilege and clerical monopolies maintained by Tehran’s ruling elite.
Over the past two weeks, a video recorded five years ago has rapidly spread across Iranian social media. In it, Naser Makarem Shirazi, a highly influential Shi’ite cleric and senior regime figure, dismissively recommends sweets in lieu of chicken for cash-strapped Iranians. Although originally made years ago, the comment has recently achieved viral notoriety, becoming a powerful symbol of the gulf between Iran’s rulers and ordinary citizens facing acute hardship.
Makarem Shirazi is not merely a religious leader; he is emblematic of the intersection between clerical authority and economic privilege. Dubbed “the Sultan of Sugar,” Shirazi and his relatives control a monopoly over Iran’s sugar imports and related food industry, enriching themselves while basic goods slip out of reach for millions. The episode has intensified public anger, not only toward Shirazi but toward the broader network of regime insiders who dominate essential sectors of the Iranian economy.
Economic Disintegration and Scapegoating
The origins of the current economic malaise are deep and multifaceted. International sanctions—sharply increased since the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement—and endemic corruption have devastated Iran’s currency, industry, and consumer purchasing power. Iranians now confront daily scarcities of poultry, meat, dairy, pharmaceuticals, and other essentials. Official data and media reports note food inflation rising above 50 percent annually, while wages lag far behind.
Despite a growing humanitarian cost, regime leaders continue to attribute hardship to ‘foreign plots’ and external pressure, while publicly promoting slogans of resistance. However, public discourse increasingly blames Iran’s governing system itself, which privileges politically connected clerics and Revolutionary Guard affiliates over the general population. This is especially true in light of revealed monopolies, such as the Shirazi family’s hold over sugar imports, and the profits reaped from government-supplied hard currency and import licenses.
Monopolies and the Political Economy of the Regime
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran’s new rulers seized critical sectors of the economy and handed ownership to trusted clerics and institutions allied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Today, business conglomerates linked to senior regime families dominate everything from food and fuel to construction and telecommunication. In the sugar sector, the Shirazi family stands out, using privileged access to government contracts and foreign currency for importation, processing, and point-of-sale distribution.
This system of cronyism and privilege regularly turns government subsidies, ostensibly meant for public benefit, into vehicles for private gain. Reports have surfaced over the years of regime insiders selling subsidized sugar, rice, and meat at vastly inflated prices, while ordinary Iranians queue for hours to buy basic groceries or are entirely priced out of the market.
Makarem Shirazi’s quip—‘if there is no chicken, eat candies’—has crystallized these frustrations. Social media is filled with parodies likening his words to infamous historical episodes of elite disregard for common suffering. Government efforts to limit online debate have failed to silence the mounting criticisms circulating among young and old alike.
Prioritizing Foreign Proxies over Domestic Welfare
Underlying Iran’s spiraling domestic problems is the regime’s strategic allocation of resources. The government continues to spend billions supporting foreign terror proxies—including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and allied militias in Syria and Iraq—through its military apparatus, most notably the IRGC. This ongoing campaign, intended to expand Iran’s regional influence and target Israel—the only Middle Eastern democracy—has required immense state funding at the direct expense of the Iranian public’s welfare.
Israeli leaders frequently underscore this point: the resources spent sustaining a regional terror campaign could be redirected toward development, education, and healthcare at home. Iran’s own people, repeatedly urged by state propaganda to endure hardship for the glory of their revolution, now express growing skepticism about leadership priorities. As the material situation worsens, the gap between regime elites and ordinary Iranians becomes ever harder for official censors to hide.
The Loss of Social Contract
Historically, the Islamic Republic legitimated its rule with promises of social justice and protection for the poor. Yet decades of cronyism, kleptocracy, and neglect have eroded public trust. Families associated with senior clerics or the IRGC enjoy lifestyles shielded from economic distress—often at the direct expense of the public. Exclusive distribution rights, import licenses, and subsidies for essentials allow regime insiders to turn scarcities into personal fortunes.
Makarem Shirazi’s sugar empire is emblematic. Such monopolies, established after the revolution, have only entrenched themselves as new crises emerge. Amid the food and currency crises, this privileged network can procure goods or hard currency unavailable to the general public, intensifying perceptions of a regime concerned more with its continuance and foreign agenda than with its own people.
Public Outcry and Long-Term Risks
Popular reaction to the resurfaced video—the phrase “if there is no chicken, eat candies” now serving as both a punchline and a condemnation—signals deepening alienation. Dissident Iranians and exiled activists cite such scandals as evidence of a regime that has lost its legitimacy, one surviving only through repression and propaganda. Social media campaigns have amplified demands for fundamental change, even as authorities intensify censorship.
Iranians now face not just the legacy of decades of corruption and regional aggression but a system seemingly incapable of reforming itself to serve the public good. For Israeli and Western policymakers, these events reaffirm long-standing analyses: so long as Iran’s regime diverts resources from its people to foreign aggression and privileges its elite, both regional stability and the well-being of ordinary Iranians will remain elusive.
Conclusion
The growing economic catastrophe within Iran has rendered visible the fault lines that run through the Islamic Republic’s political and economic order. The episode surrounding Makarem Shirazi’s flippant advice—and the public fury it has provoked—highlight the urgent demand for accountability, transparency, and a radical redirection of state resources to serve Iranian citizens, not the ambitions of a privileged few or their terror proxies across the Middle East. Until then, viral moments like these will continue to expose the moral and structural crisis at the core of the Iranian regime.
