Iran’s senior leadership has openly confirmed that the military strength of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) serves as a critical component in enhancing Tehran’s diplomatic leverage during negotiations with the United States. In an interview with Iranian news agency ILNA, Rasul Sinaei-Rad, deputy head of the ideological office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, outlined how the regime’s policy of deterrence and demonstration of force are deliberately integrated with its diplomatic efforts.
The remarks shed light on Iran’s dual-track approach: exercising robust military preparedness and technological advancement alongside active diplomatic engagement. Sinaei-Rad described the IRGC’s continuous training exercises and rapid technological evolution as serving not just a tactical function but also as strategic messaging aimed at adversaries—highlighting an Iranian strategy in which any perceived threat becomes an opportunity to display resolve and gain bargaining power.
According to Sinaei-Rad, Iran’s security forces maintain a constant state of alert, standing ready to respond forcefully to any aggression regardless of the status of negotiations. This posture allows Iranian negotiators to present themselves as confident and assertive, underpinned by the visible threat of retaliation. The IRGC’s drills and weapons tests, regularly publicized by state media, are intended to assure domestic audiences of readiness while signaling to foreign adversaries, particularly the United States and Israel, that Iran is prepared for escalation if necessary.
This approach reflects decades of Iranian doctrine since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, where the regime fused ideological resistance with a strategy of asymmetric power projection. The IRGC serves as both protector of the revolutionary regime and executor of the Supreme Leader’s foreign policy directives. Its influence permeates Iranian society, the economy, and, crucially, Iran’s network of regional proxies and terror affiliates across the Middle East.
Iran’s expansion of its military and technological capabilities parallels the advancement of its nuclear program, the development of ballistic and cruise missiles, maritime harassment tactics, and the deployment of sophisticated drone and cyber tools. Whenever diplomatic processes such as the nuclear talks have resumed, the IRGC has matched them with shows of force—blurring the lines between negotiation and coercion.
Beyond Iran’s borders, the IRGC is the architect of a vast web of terror proxies: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria. This axis—the so-called “Axis of Resistance”—serves as both a buffer and a forward operating network, enabling Tehran to pose persistent threats to Israel and destabilize U.S. partners in the region.
The October 7th, 2023, Hamas massacre, which marked the deadliest antisemitic attack since the Holocaust, drew international attention to the tangible consequences of Iran’s longstanding support for regional terror groups. Israeli officials regularly cite the IRGC as not only a sponsor but an instigator, arming terrorist organizations with advanced explosives, drones, and strategies that directly target Israeli civilians.
Israel views the IRGC and its transnational proxy network as an existential threat. Israeli military operations—including ongoing campaigns in Syria and precision strikes on weapons convoys—are conducted as acts of self-defense, aiming to disrupt the IRGC’s efforts to entrench itself on Israel’s borders. The development of multi-layered missile and drone defense systems like Iron Dome and David’s Sling is a direct response to IRGC-backed rockets and missiles that routinely target Israeli population centers.
The United States, recognizing the IRGC’s central role in international terror and regional instability, designated the organization as a terrorist group in 2019. By highlighting the IRGC’s involvement in proxy wars, assassinations, and attacks on U.S. and allied personnel, Washington continues to navigate the delicate balance between reengaging Iran in diplomacy and countering its aggressive activities.
However, Iran’s admission, as articulated by Sinaei-Rad, that regime legitimacy at the negotiating table is bound to maintaining an image of unyielding strength, reveals the underlying fragility of the regime’s posture. While publicized military exercises and technological demonstrations are meant to deter, they equally betray a concern that any appearance of weakness may invite pressure or preemptive actions from adversaries.
In this context, every display of IRGC prowess, every televised launch of a new missile or drone, and every war game in the Persian Gulf serves a dual function: to prepare for conflict and to ensure adversaries negotiate with Tehran from a position of caution, if not fear. This dynamic is deeply understood in Jerusalem, Washington, and among U.S. regional allies.
As diplomatic efforts continue at various levels, the Israeli government remains resolute, reaffirming that it will not permit Iran to develop nuclear weapons or to gain uncontested regional dominance. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz repeatedly reiterate that Israel’s defensive actions are essential for the nation’s survival, not merely optional responses to temporary provocations. The symbiotic relationship between Iranian diplomacy and armed escalation reaffirms for Israel and its allies that engagement with Tehran must be accompanied by vigilance and preparedness for further military confrontation.
Sinaei-Rad’s public assertion confirms a longstanding reality of regional geopolitics: For Iran, the demonstration of military might is inseparable from its broader international strategy. Israel and the West, facing an IRGC determined to fuse negotiation with intimidation, must craft responses that recognize this hybrid challenge. Regional stability and international security will depend on containing the expansion and technological escalation of forces like the IRGC, ensuring that the pursuit of diplomacy never becomes a pretext for allowing further Iranian aggression.
