JERUSALEM – The United States is seeking to restrict Iran’s uranium enrichment to no higher than 3.67 percent purity, officials have said, signaling a strategic pivot in negotiations with Tehran that leaves much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure intact and raises alarm in Israel over the security implications of such a deal.
US officials outlined the approach in recent statements, emphasizing that the primary American objective in ongoing talks is to ensure Iran’s uranium enrichment does not exceed the agreed civilian threshold of 3.67 percent. Israeli security analysts and senior policymakers, however, warn that this policy falls short of the full dismantlement of the Iranian nuclear program, does not address the threat posed by Iranian-backed terror proxies, and risks tying Israel’s hands in the event of a future crisis.
Background: The 3.67% Limit and Past Negotiations
The 3.67 percent enrichment limit is a direct reference to the restrictions originally set out under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was designed to prevent Iran from acquiring sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The JCPOA, reached between Tehran, the United States, and other world powers, allowed Iran to maintain domestic enrichment technology and a civilian nuclear program in exchange for phased sanctions relief. Critics, including most Israeli officials and Western intelligence agencies, argued that such limits merely delayed Iran’s nuclear breakout capability, while leaving infrastructure and know-how largely unimpacted.
Following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran has openly breached enrichment caps, expanded its stockpiles of enriched uranium beyond permitted levels, and installed advanced centrifuges. These capabilities have dramatically reduced the time required for Iran to reach weapons-grade enrichment if it were to abandon its obligations under any renewed terms.
Jerusalem’s Strategic Concerns
For Israel, the prospect of a renewed nuclear agreement that leaves Iran’s core facilities undismantled represents what officials call “the worst-case scenario.”
Senior Israeli government and defense figures, citing Iran’s long history of regional subversion through terrorist proxies, insist that nuclear constraints must go beyond technical enrichment limits. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) orchestrates dozens of proxy militias across the Middle East, notably Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite groups in Syria and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. These proxies have perpetrated repeated terror attacks against Israel and other states, constituting a persistent threat to regional stability.
The massacre of over 1,200 Israelis by Hamas terrorists on October 7, 2023—the deadliest antisemitic atrocity since the Holocaust—amplified Israeli fears of what Iran and its proxies are capable of. That attack, involving murders, sexual violence, and the abduction of civilians, was accompanied by a new round of rocket fire from Lebanon and Gaza, underlining the risk posed by a network of Iranian-backed forces that are largely outside the scope of nuclear talks.
Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Israel Katz, and IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, maintain that true nuclear rollback must entail the “Libya model”—complete dismantlement of all enrichment and missile technology, paired with the disbanding of terror armies and irreversible limits on Iranian regional reach.
US-Israeli Frictions and Limitations
In Jerusalem’s view, any nuclear deal that preserves Iran’s ability to restart enrichment at will is fundamentally insufficient. US diplomats have signaled privately that a new deal would involve concerted pressure on Israel not to take unilateral military action against Iranian nuclear sites, raising the prospect that Israel’s strategic autonomy and right of self-defense could be constrained by international agreements it did not endorse. Israeli sources warn that diplomatic pressure, limits on intelligence-sharing, or even arms supply adjustments could result from such a framework.
Proxies and Unaddressed Threats
Another core Israeli objection is that US-negotiated proposals have not included any conditions for the dismantlement of Iran’s proxy groups. The IRGC’s strategy of arming, funding, and directing state and non-state armed groups in the region has allowed Iran to destabilize states and launch attacks against Israeli civilians with plausible deniability. Recent years have seen an uptick in sophisticated Iranian-equipped drone and missile attacks launched by Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis—capabilities that directly threaten Israeli population centers and the region’s critical infrastructure.
The Ongoing Regional Fallout
Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, though not formal participants in the JCPOA, share deep reservations about any nuclear accord that permits Iran to maintain its regional military networks. These concerns have pushed some Gulf Arab states into closer, albeit often discreet, security coordination with Israel. The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, formalized this emerging partnership, linking Israeli and Arab interests in confronting Iranian expansionism. This security calculus has only become more urgent as tensions in Lebanon, Gaza, and the Red Sea have spiked in the wake of Hamas’s October 7 massacre and subsequent Iranian-orchestrated provocations.
Legal and Historical Perspective
International law acknowledges the right of states to act in preemptive self-defense if faced with an imminent threat of grave harm. Israeli legal and military authorities continue to invoke this doctrine as justification for preventive or retaliatory strikes against Iranian nuclear and proxy infrastructure should diplomatic efforts fail. The precedent of the Libyan nuclear dismantlement—where Muammar Gaddafi agreed to eliminate all sensitive nuclear activities in exchange for international rehabilitation—remains Israel’s baseline for any credible resolution to the Iran nuclear issue.
Forward-Looking Israeli Responses
Military and diplomatic officials in Israel are reportedly intensifying preparations for both independent and coordinated responses to Iran’s nuclear trajectory and proxy strategy. These include:
– Enhancing long-range military strike capabilities and intelligence gathering on Iranian nuclear and missile sites
– Upgrading missile defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, Arrow, and David’s Sling, in anticipation of new fronts or mass attacks
– Expanding diplomatic outreach to Europe and moderate Arab states, focusing on counter-proliferation and joint security action
– Deepening cyber and intelligence partnerships, in particular with agencies focused on the IRGC and its network
Israeli strategists and policymakers remain adamant: any international agreement that leaves Iran’s enrichment and proxy apparatuses unchecked is a temporary reprieve at best—and a critical security failure at worst. The perception in Jerusalem is that Israel’s survival depends on its freedom to act unilaterally, should the United States and other allies be unwilling or unable to enforce truly robust countermeasures against Iranian nuclear or terrorist advances.
Conclusion
With negotiations ongoing and the specter of a potential US-Iran agreement looming, Israel continues to underscore its red lines: no tolerance for an Iranian nuclear threshold state, no compromise on self-defense, and no acceptance of Tehran’s regional terror armories. Unless these principles are fully integrated into any diplomatic solution, Israeli leaders warn the conflict with Iran and its proxies is likely to escalate, threatening not only Israeli security but the broader stability of the Middle East.
