Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s latest comments on Iranian nuclear ambitions continue to generate serious concern in Israel’s security circles. While Trump has pledged to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, his statements—explicitly referencing actions to “blow them up or just de-nuke them”—have left significant ambiguity about the final status of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, raising fears in Israel that existential threats are far from resolved.
For decades, Israel has viewed Iran’s nuclear program as a direct danger to its existence, noting the regime’s repeated public threats to annihilate the Jewish state and its longstanding efforts to develop both the scientific and technological basis for nuclear weapons production. With Iran now enriching uranium close to weapons-grade purity at advanced facilities, Israeli authorities emphasize that simply preventing weapon assembly leaves the Iranian regime dangerously close to achieving nuclear weapons capability at a moment’s notice—a scenario often termed as a “threshold state.”
Trump’s Approach: No Bomb, but Program Remains
During Trump’s presidency, the U.S. withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), citing weaknesses such as sunset clauses and its failure to address Iran’s ballistic missile program or regional aggression. However, Trump’s rhetoric as a candidate and former president—reflected in calls to “de-nuke” Iran—has followed American diplomatic precedent by targeting weaponization rather than the full dismantlement of enrichment infrastructure. The use of “de-nuke” is widely interpreted to mean removing or destroying weapons or near-ready weapon components, but not necessarily the comprehensive elimination of centrifuge facilities, fissile material stockpiles, or nuclear expertise.
Israeli defense officials and policy makers, including IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, repeatedly state that as long as Iran maintains the technical capability to enrich uranium and assemble advanced centrifuges, the regime holds a permanent threat over Israel and the broader Middle East. The ability to rapidly “break out” from a civilian nuclear posture to weapons assembly could, under present technologies, be measured in weeks—a reality confirmed by multiple IAEA reports and Western intelligence assessments.
Israeli Doctrine: Zero Enrichment, Zero Threat
Israeli doctrine, articulated through multiple governments and security agencies, dictates that only the complete elimination of Iranian enrichment capability—civilian or otherwise—can reliably remove the existential danger. Past operations, such as the 1981 destruction of Iraq’s Osirak reactor and the 2007 destruction of Syria’s covert reactor near Deir ez-Zor, serve as precedents for decisive unilateral Israeli action when international assurances fall short. Officials in Jerusalem have consistently warned that they reserve the right to act—including militarily—if diplomacy fails to fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program.
This clarity contrasts with the more flexible approaches found in Western capitals, which have sometimes pursued containment and inspection over full dismantlement. As a result, Israeli leaders, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, maintain pressure on U.S. and European policymakers not to accept the continued enrichment and research activities by Iran, even under strict inspection protocols. Israel’s position is clear: Without eradicating Iran’s potential to resume weaponization, the risk endures, regionally and globally.
Regional and Strategic Implications
The implications extend far beyond Israel’s borders. Efforts to constrain only the weaponization aspect of Iran’s nuclear program risk triggering a regional arms race. Several Arab states, foremost among them Saudi Arabia, have publicly indicated their intention to seek comparable nuclear programs should Iran be allowed to stand on the threshold of weaponization. Such proliferation would heavily undermine non-proliferation treaties and increase the risk of nuclear weapons or technology falling into the hands of terrorist organizations—many already supported and armed by Tehran.
Iran wields influence through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which controls a web of proxy militias and terrorist groups including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen, and various formations in Syria and Iraq. These proxies have acted with increasing boldness, relying on Iranian supplies of advanced missiles and drones to target both Israel and U.S. partners in the region. The combination of nuclear threshold status and conventional proxy power would further embolden Tehran, deepening instability.
The Path Ahead: Israeli Security at the Forefront
For Israel, the stakes could not be higher. The October 7 Hamas massacre—the deadliest antisemitic attack since the Holocaust—served as a shockwave reminder of the lethality of the Iranian-backed axis. Israeli policymakers, security officials, and the broader public understand that the only credible guarantee for survival lies in a forced rollback of Iran’s nuclear technical base, not mere promises to stop a bomb.
Despite ongoing international diplomatic efforts, the risk remains that the wider world could accept an agreement stopping short of full dismantlement—one that might reduce the immediacy of the nuclear threat, but at the cost of a dangerous long-term precedent. Israeli officials warn that such half-measures could necessitate independent Israeli or joint Western military operations against Iranian nuclear sites, many of which are now underground and heavily fortified.
Conclusion: No Substitute for Complete Dismantlement
While U.S. rhetoric, especially from figures like Trump, emphasizes American resolve in preventing a nuclear-armed Iran, Israeli defense policy requires clarity and comprehensiveness that extends beyond ambiguous language or interim agreements. Dismantling Iran’s enrichment capability is the only path that ensures Israel’s long-term safety and preserves what remains of regional order. As the Iranian regime continues to defy international norms, the question is no longer whether Israel will act if faced with existential peril, but only when, and with whose support.
