The outcome of recent local elections in Lebanon’s historically contested Bekaa and Baalbek regions provides sobering insight into the persistent grasp of Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed terrorist group, over broad segments of Lebanese society and governance. The electoral victory of Hezbollah-aligned lists in these districts sharply contrasts claims of the group’s decline or destruction, highlighting the enduring hybrid model of militant, political, and social engagement that has made Hezbollah one of the most formidable non-state actors in the modern Middle East.
Established in the wake of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon—an intervention aimed at eliminating threats from Palestinian armed factions—Hezbollah has evolved from a clandestine Shiite militia to the de facto governing authority within significant areas of Lebanon. Supported financially, militarily, and ideologically by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hezbollah has functioned not only as a terrorist proxy but as an influential political party, welfare provider, and arbiter of power within the Lebanese state apparatus. According to official Lebanese government sources and extensive investigations conducted by both Western and regional news agencies, Hezbollah’s influence is most pronounced in the Shiite-majority regions of southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, where its patronage networks have addressed chronic state failure and economic deprivation, often supplanting the role of the central government (Reuters, 2024; United Nations Security Council Reports).
These recent municipal contests reaffirmed Hezbollah’s status among its constituents, with the movement’s slate securing overwhelming victories in Bekaa and Baalbek, localities marked by deep socio-economic divides, historical marginalization, and a legacy of state neglect. The resilience of Hezbollah’s electoral machine is further testament to the effectiveness of its grassroots mobilization and the extent of its ideological and material penetration. Western analysts and Lebanese civil society figures note that while these wins are frequently engineered through a combination of patronage, coercion, and sectarian loyalty, they also reflect the group’s continued ability to cast itself as the defender of Lebanon’s Shiite heartland against both internal disorder and perceived external enemies—chiefly Israel and, more distantly, the West (Carnegie Middle East Center, 2023; US State Department Briefings).
The broader regional context frames Hezbollah’s enduring relevance as part of what Iranian leaders term the “Axis of Resistance”—a coalition of state and non-state actors, including Hamas in Gaza, various Iraqi Shia militias, the Houthis in Yemen, and elements of the Assad regime in Syria, united by hostility to Israel and Western influence. Hezbollah’s political successes cannot be decoupled from its ongoing military entrenchment across the Lebanese-Israeli border, its role in the Syrian civil war, or its participation in cross-border attacks and rocket barrages that have repeatedly threatened to ignite a broader conflagration. Since the onset of the Iron Swords War in October 2023—triggered by Hamas’s massacre of Israeli civilians and the subsequent Israeli response in Gaza—Hezbollah has sustained a campaign of harassment and escalation along the northern front, launching missiles, drones, and mortars at Israeli military and civilian targets. The Israeli Defense Forces, under Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Eyal Zamir, have responded with precision airstrikes and artillery fire aimed at degrading Hezbollah’s advanced weapons systems, command centers, and cross-border launch capabilities (IDF Spokesperson Unit, 2024; AFP).
Despite repeated Israeli and international efforts to contain or roll back Hezbollah’s influence, a combination of domestic Lebanese fragmentation and Iranian support has enabled the terrorist group to weather sanctions, targeted killings of senior commanders, and successive rounds of conflict. Crucially, Hezbollah’s entrenchment in Lebanon’s sectarian political system limits the ability of the central state—or external actors—to decisively challenge its control. The movement’s dual identity, as both a recognized parliamentary bloc and an armed militia beyond the remit of the Lebanese Armed Forces, enables it to dictate terms across vast areas of the country. According to research published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and corroborated by UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) patrol logs, Hezbollah regularly restricts the freedom of action of international peacekeepers and exerts de facto sovereignty in areas that should nominally be under Lebanese state authority.
The implications of these realities are profound for Lebanon’s stability, Israel’s security, and the broader struggle between Western democracies and Iranian-backed proxy networks. From a Western liberal perspective, Hezbollah’s entrenchment represents a direct challenge to the ideals of sovereign governance, democratic accountability, and the protection of civil society. The group’s record of political intimidation, interference in the judiciary, and systemic corruption—documented by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Lebanese anti-corruption activists—undermines efforts to build effective, transparent government institutions and perpetuates economic crisis. Lebanon’s ongoing financial collapse, precipitated by decades of mismanagement and exacerbated by Hezbollah’s parallel power structures, has left millions impoverished and driven significant emigration, further weakening social cohesion and state resilience.
Hezbollah’s legitimacy among its base, though founded partially on economic patronage and provision of welfare services, is equally built upon a relentless narrative of resistance—against Israel, Western intervention, and any domestic critics labeled as traitors or collaborators. This resistance doctrine, rooted in the Shia ethos of martyrdom and revolutionary struggle, has justified the group’s involvement in wars beyond Lebanon’s borders, including the deployment of thousands of fighters to Syria in defense of Bashar Assad’s regime, as well as logistical, political, and financial support for allied groups from Gaza to Yemen. The group’s integration into Iran’s grand regional strategy complicates efforts to broker lasting peace or curtail the proliferation of advanced weaponry—especially given ongoing reports from Western intelligence agencies and the United Nations regarding Iranian arms shipments via Syria and clandestine supply chains (UN Panel of Experts Reports; US Treasury Sanctions Announcements).
The persistent electoral strength of Hezbollah-aligned lists has sparked frustration but little surprise among Lebanese reformists and Western diplomats. Efforts to build a robust, nationwide opposition to Hezbollah’s influence have been repeatedly hindered by sectarian dynamics, limited organizational capacity, and the pervasive climate of violence and intimidation faced by dissenters. Leading civil society organizations warn that anti-Hezbollah activists and journalists operate under constant threat of harassment, arrest, or even assassination, as evidenced by a series of unsolved attacks against vocal critics over the past decade (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2024). Internal divisions among Lebanon’s Christians, Sunnis, and Druze further fragment the anti-Hezbollah camp, making comprehensive political reform all the more elusive.
Meanwhile, Israel remains acutely alert to the threat posed by Hezbollah’s expanding arsenal—including precision-guided missiles, drones, and bunker networks—viewing the group as an Iranian expeditionary force on its northern frontier. As recently as April 2024, Israeli officials confirmed intercepting significant Hezbollah-launched drone and rocket barrages targeting civilian communities, reiterating that the group’s violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1701—mandating the disarmament of non-state militias—constitutes a grave threat to regional security (Israel Ministry of Defense, 2024; United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon Reports). In response, Israeli military planners have signaled that future escalations could prompt more extensive operations against Hezbollah’s positions, with pervasive fears in both Jerusalem and Western capitals that such conflict risks dragging an already volatile region into outright war.
The October 7, 2023 massacre in southern Israel—in which Hamas terrorists murdered, raped, and mutilated over 1,200 Israeli civilians, the deadliest antisemitic atrocity since the Holocaust—has further reframed the debate over how to counter Iranian-backed terror groups. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz, backed by the United States under President Donald Trump, have emphasized that the actions of Hamas, Hezbollah, and their affiliates are inextricably linked and must be addressed as a unified threat. Washington has maintained its designation of Hezbollah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, expanded sanctions against its financial networks, and, in coordination with Israel and Arab allies, increased military readiness across the Levant and Gulf to deter further aggression (US Department of State, 2024; White House Statements).
Yet, the possibility of definitive action against Hezbollah is constrained by Lebanon’s civilian population, the risk of mass casualties, and the group’s deep embedment within daily life in regions like Baalbek and Bekaa. Both Israeli and American officials have repeatedly articulated the distinction between legitimate military targets and the broader populations held hostage to Hezbollah’s perpetual war footing. The group’s well-documented use of civilian infrastructure—schools, mosques, hospitals—as cover for weapons stockpiles and command centers complicates efforts to dismantle its terrorist apparatus without triggering devastating collateral damage or broader regional escalation (Amnesty International; Israeli Air Force Briefings).
Broader international efforts, including those led by the European Union, United Nations, and Arab League, have made intermittent appeals for the full enforcement of Security Council resolutions, disarmament of illegal militias, and the restoration of effective Lebanese sovereignty over its territory. However, successive governments in Beirut—hamstrung by confessional power-sharing arrangements and the political dominance of Hezbollah’s March 8 Alliance—have proven either unwilling or unable to confront the group’s armed wing. Even the Lebanese Armed Forces, the formal military of the republic, are constrained both by politics and by limited resources, and have at times coordinated with Hezbollah on matters of mutual interest, further diluting prospects for independent action.
Public sentiment within Lebanon remains deeply divided, with frustration at widespread corruption, economic collapse, and political paralysis coexisting with, and often reinforcing, a resigned acceptance of Hezbollah’s dominance as a fait accompli. Mass protests during the October 2019 “thawra” (revolution) briefly united cross-sectarian opposition to endemic misrule, but failed to overcome deep-rooted sectarian barriers or to dislodge either Hezbollah or its allies from the levers of state power. For many in Baalbek, Bekaa, and southern Lebanon, the group remains the principal—if deeply flawed—provider of security, social services, and symbolic justice in a landscape marked by the near-total absence of effective rule of law.
The current status quo, underscored by the results of municipal elections, underscores the urgent dilemmas facing Western policymakers: whether to increase pressure on Iran and its proxies through sanctions, covert action, and support for opposition groups, or to pursue contested diplomatic initiatives in hopes of stabilizing Lebanon and separating its fate from Tehran’s regional ambitions. The challenge remains compounded by the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza and southern Lebanon, the persistent risk of Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, and the possibility, voiced in multiple Western policy forums, that any sustainable resolution will require not only the disarmament of terrorist groups but the rebuilding of Lebanon’s deeply fractured state institutions (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024).
The situation is compounded by the global rise in antisemitic incidents, many catalyzed by events in the Middle East, and the broader struggle over the narrative legitimacy of Israel’s operations. Western democracies, led by the United States and supported by European allies, have continued to defend Israel’s inherent right to self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, while calling for measures to minimize civilian harm. The experience of the October 7th massacre, and the ongoing hostage crisis involving innocent Israeli and foreign nationals seized by Hamas, serve as reminders of the profound stakes involved: the difference between a sovereign democracy defending its population from terror and proxy militias waging campaigns of ideological violence with regional backing.
As Hezbollah’s dominance in Bekaa and Baalbek attests, the group is far from destroyed or diminished. On the contrary, its hybrid model of political-military engagement persists as one of the central obstacles to restoring Lebanese sovereignty, achieving peace along Israel’s northern border, and curbing the ambitions of Iran’s axis of resistance. The continuities of violence, sectarian division, and regional rivalry continue to define the Lebanese-Israeli frontier—the contours of a war imposed upon Israel by a network of Iranian-backed terrorist groups, with Hezbollah as among its most dangerous and entrenched components. Addressing this threat, as events on the ground and at the polls make starkly clear, will require not simply military responses or condemnation, but sustained, principled engagement from the West on behalf of democratic values, security, and the restoration of legitimate governance across the still-fractured Middle East.
