The Hamas-led massacre of October 7, 2023—a coordinated terrorist assault that killed over 1,200 Israeli civilians and abducted more than 250 hostages—has deeply shaken the Middle East, sparking renewed violence and significant shifts in regional policy. As Israel wages an ongoing defensive campaign to dismantle Hamas and secure the return of its citizens, key Arab states are reassessing longstanding assumptions about relations with Israel and the menace of Iranian-backed terror groups.
A prominent Saudi analyst recently argued that the October 7th attack not only shocked the region at large but fundamentally altered Saudi Arabia’s approach to Israel, describing prospective ties as now ‘toxic.’ This assessment, increasingly echoed by regional commentators and diplomats, emerges at a pivotal moment for the Abraham Accords process and for Israel’s position in a strategic contest with the Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies.
Saudi Arabia, long seen as the most influential candidate for normalization with Israel under U.S. mediation, had been incrementally moving toward a détente in the years preceding October 7. Behind-the-scenes security dialogue and intelligence coordination with Jerusalem, prompted by mutual concerns over Iranian regional ambitions, were quietly deepening. Riyadh’s Vision 2030, an ambitious economic and modernization program, also envisioned new opportunities for technology transfer and economic cooperation with Israel. These overtures were underpinned by a broader Arab realignment starting with the Abraham Accords, which saw the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan establish formal ties with Israel for the first time in decades.
Hamas’s October 7th massacre—explicitly facilitated, armed, and financed by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—was conceived in part to sabotage these emerging partnerships. By unleashing unprecedented carnage and capturing international headlines, Hamas sought to inflame antisemitic sentiment, polarize Arab governments, and drive a wedge between Israel and the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia. Iran’s goal: deter normalization by weaponizing outrage and reinforcing the narrative that engagement with Israel is a betrayal of the Arab and Islamic world.
The immediate aftermath saw Saudi Arabia, along with much of the Arab League, condemn the violence against civilians, while also criticizing Israel’s subsequent military response and expressing concern for Gaza residents. These statements reflect both decades of anti-Israeli propaganda and acute sensitivity to Arab public opinion, which is frequently fueled by misinformation, and Hamas-orchestrated social media campaigns. Such dynamics illustrate the significant domestic and regional pressures that Arab monarchies face as they consider any public dimension to Israeli ties.
Nevertheless, Riyadh’s official posture has masked a more complex reckoning within its policy establishment. Security officials in Saudi Arabia are acutely aware of the real threat posed by Iranian-backed forces, not just to Israel but to the stability of the Kingdom and its Gulf neighbors. Attacks by Yemen’s Houthis on Saudi infrastructure, cyber offensives and missile strikes orchestrated from Iranian territory, and persistent attempts to stir upheaval all demonstrate the shared security landscape confronting Israel and Saudi Arabia.
In this context, a ‘toxic’ relationship with Israel must be understood as a reflection of current public sensitivities rather than a permanent policy reversal. Even as anti-normalization sentiment has grown in the wake of the conflict, reports indicate that intelligence cooperation and backchannel communications continue, especially regarding Iranian activities. The fundamental calculus for Riyadh has not changed: peace, security, and modernization rest on confronting Iranian-sponsored terrorism and finding practical ways to coexist with Israel.
This delicate balance is further complicated by America’s ongoing involvement. The United States, under President Donald Trump and subsequent administrations, has consistently encouraged Arab-Israeli normalization as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. U.S. security guarantees and diplomatic pressure remain critical to the long-term viability of normalization; how Washington navigates this period of instability will determine whether Arab states see normalization with Israel as ultimately advantageous or prohibitively costly.
The moral and political stakes of this realignment are immense. Israel’s campaign in Gaza is rooted in the right of self-defense—an internationally recognized response to acts of relentless terror and mass murder. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and other arms of the Iranian axis in Syria and Iraq are committed to Israel’s destruction and the perpetuation of regional conflict. These are not political parties or liberation movements—they are terrorist organizations targeting civilians, suppressing dissent within their own territories, and destabilizing neighboring states in line with Tehran’s strategic objectives.
The October 7th massacre was the single deadliest antisemitic attack since the Holocaust. Atrocities committed by Hamas and its collaborators—including executions, torture, sexual abuse, and the abduction of schoolchildren—are meticulously documented and have served as a grim catalyst for action across the Arab world. For Saudi Arabia, the events have underscored that no amount of diplomatic hedging can substitute for concerted confrontation with Iranian-backed terror. While Riyadh’s public rhetoric is more cautious, private security cooperation—especially in intelligence, cyber defense, and counterterrorism—remains crucial to both nations’ interests.
The Abraham Accords, rather than being nullified, have revealed both the profound possibilities and the acute vulnerabilities of this moment. Iran’s ability to disrupt normalization through its proxies is precisely why deepening state-to-state Arab-Israeli cooperation remains an existential necessity for the region’s moderates. The trade-offs facing Saudi policymakers are substantial, but the logic of collective security and progress fundamentally links Saudi Arabia’s fate to that of Israel.
In summary, the October 7th atrocities have not extinguished prospects for eventual Saudi-Israeli normalization but have made public engagement more fraught in the near term. With terrorism and Iranian subversion looming as central challenges, the Saudi-Israeli relationship must adapt—downplaying open diplomatic gestures while intensifying covert efforts to counter the threats pressing upon both states. Success or failure in confronting these dangers will shape the regional order for decades to come, with implications that extend far beyond the present crisis.
